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The Economics and Regulation of Bank 
Overdraft Protection 
Todd J. Zywicki* 
Abstract 
Consumer use of bank overdraft protection has risen rapidly 
over the past decade, leading to increased scrutiny and the 
imposition of new regulations. Public and political debate regarding 
overdraft protection has highlighted anecdotal stories about 
irresponsible college students who overdraw their accounts to buy a 
cup of coffee, thereby triggering substantial overdraft fees. But there 
has been little systematic examination of the safety and soundness or 
consumer protection issues implicated by the increased use of 
overdraft protection. 
Available evidence indicates that those who rely on overdraft 
protection tend to have low credit ratings and use overdraft 
protection to maintain short-term liquidity because it is less 
expensive and more convenient than available alternatives. These 
alternatives include other credit options, such as payday lending, or 
options such as bounced checks or dishonored payments, the latter of 
which may result in eviction or termination of utilities or other 
services. 
There is no evidence that those who use overdraft protection are 
unaware of the cost or otherwise use overdraft protection foolishly or 
unknowingly. In addition, there is no evidence that banks are 
earning economic rents off the issuance of overdraft protection, as 
increases in overdraft revenues have been offset by dramatic 
increases in free checking, improved quality, and free services offered 
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to bank customers. A serious reduction in overdraft revenues would 
reverse all of these trends and result in many consumers being driven 
out of the mainstream financial system, especially low-income 
consumers. 
Absent a demonstrable market failure or demonstration of 
systematic consumer abuse, restriction on consumer choice of 
overdraft protection would likely impose substantial costs on 
consumers and banks with minimal gains. 
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I. Introduction 
Consumer use of bank overdraft protection has risen rapidly 
over the past decade.1 In 2010, thirteen million consumers used 
overdraft protection, and banks generated $35 billion in revenue 
from overdraft fees, an important and growing part of total bank 
revenue.2 In turn, this growth has spawned increased media and 
regulatory attention focused on the product. Standard economic 
analysis recognizes increased demand for a product—including a 
financial product such as overdraft protection—as evidence of 
consumer satisfaction and demand for the product. Bank regulators, 
by contrast, have raised concerns about the increased use of 
overdraft protection by consumers and have issued regulatory 
guidance regarding the product under a safety and soundness 
rationale. In 2009, the Federal Reserve imposed new limits on 
overdraft protection that made it more difficult for banks to provide 
the service to consumers.3 The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC)4 and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC)5 have also issued guidance on overdraft protection 
and pricing. In addition, the newly-created Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) created by the Dodd–Frank Financial 
                                                                                                     
 1. Suzanne Kapner, Overdraft Fees Boost for Banks, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2011, at 13 (noting that Moebs estimated that banks charged overdraft fees of 
$36.5 billion in 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Amendments to Regulation E, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033 (Nov. 17, 2009) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (limiting the ability of financial institutions 
to assess an overdraft fee for ATM and debit card transactions by requiring 
customers of the institutions to affirmatively “opt-in” to these services). 
 4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-81-2010, FINAL OVERDRAFT PAYMENT 
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT 
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE]. 
 5. See OCC Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 
Fed. Reg. 33,409 (proposed June 8, 2011) (proposing regulation on automatic 
overdraft protection and direct deposit advance programs). 
1144 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141 (2012) 
Regulatory Reform Legislation,6 is also expected to consider 
additional restrictions on overdraft protection through regulation or 
enforcement actions. 
Public and political debate regarding overdraft protection has 
highlighted anecdotal stories about irresponsible college students 
who overdraw their accounts to buy a cup of coffee, thereby 
triggering substantial overdraft fees.7 Irresponsible college students 
who cannot or will not balance their check books, however, are a 
small fraction of those who use overdraft protection in any given 
year. More important, although this subset of overdraft-users might 
view the availability of overdraft as unnecessary or even a nuisance, 
for millions of others, overdraft can be a valuable tool to deal with 
short-term liquidity issues. The wisdom of imposing new guidance 
or regulations that could impair access to overdraft protection 
should be judged not by unrepresentative anecdotes but by seeking 
to understand the typical users of overdraft protection, why they use 
the product, and whether they understand its true cost relative to 
alternatives. 
This Article seeks to take a first step toward answering those 
questions. To date, regulation has been promulgated despite an 
almost complete lack of knowledge about consumer demand for 
overdraft protection and without any rigorous analysis of safety and 
soundness or consumer protection questions. Although the analysis 
presented here should be understood as tentative, not 
comprehensive, this first look at consumer use of overdraft 
protection suggests that those who use overdraft protection 
generally do so because the real-world alternatives that are 
available are more expensive or less flexible and convenient than 
overdraft protection, especially when the full cost of alternatives is 
taken into account, including time, travel, and convenience. 
Moreover, those who use overdraft protection the most—and thus 
those about whom regulators appear to be most concerned—
generally use the product rationally in light of available 
alternatives, indicating that they are generally aware of the costs 
                                                                                                     
 6. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 7. See Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is 
Painful, But Not for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A1 (relating a story 
about a 59-year-old graduate student who owed $238 in overcharge fees for 
seven purchases that were each under $12). 
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and benefits of overdraft protection and choose to use it anyway. In 
a free society, absent compelling evidence that consumers are 
ignorant or irremediably foolish—neither of which has been 
demonstrated with respect to overdraft protection—people are 
assumed to be the best judges of what is in their interests and 
should remain free to choose. If this is true, then restricting access 
to overdraft protection will harm most those supposedly sought to be 
helped. 
To date, while regulators have imposed regulations and 
proposed still further interventions, they have provided no tangible 
evidence of safety and soundness risk, consumer harm, or other 
market failure from overdraft protection. Nor have they provided 
any evidence that consumers, especially high-intensity users, are 
unaware of the cost of overdraft protection or other key terms of the 
contract or that they use overdraft protection irrationally in light of 
available alternatives. Most importantly, regulators have provided 
no evidence that curtailing access to overdraft protection would help 
those consumers intended to be helped by the limitations. Those 
using overdraft protection generally do so because it is preferable to 
their available alternatives, and forcibly reducing access will make 
many consumers significantly worse off by increasing the frequency 
of adverse events such as bounced checks, possible criminal 
prosecution, utility shut-offs, and evictions, or, alternatively, forcing 
greater use of high-cost alternatives such as payday loans, pawn 
shops, rent-to-own, and even illegal lenders. 
This Article explores the economics of overdraft usage by 
consumers and banks to understand the economic logic of the 
product. It then examines the recent regulatory initiatives by the 
Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC governing overdraft protection 
issued under the rubric of safety and soundness protection as well 
as purported consumer protection rationales that might prompt 
regulatory action by the CFPB. The case for regulation in this area 
under traditional safety and soundness is exceedingly weak and the 
evidence of harm that would justify action under a consumer 
protection rationale, such as evidence of a lack of consumer 
understanding of the product’s terms or prices, is nearly 
nonexistent. Moreover, although some of the regulations that have 
been issued to date have been troublesome but not crippling, the 
unintended consequences that followed in the wake of the Federal 
Reserve’s 2009 rules illustrate the potential for more serious harm 
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that could follow from intrusive regulation that dramatically limits 
access to or the usefulness of overdraft protection. In particular, 
although prudential safety and soundness regulators have taken a 
relatively cautious approach to the issue, it is foreseeable that an 
activist CFPB could dramatically reduce access to and the 
usefulness of overdraft protection, with far-reaching consequences 
for consumers, the banking system, and the national economy. 
Sensible regulation of courtesy overdraft protection services 
begins with a sound understanding of who uses overdraft protection 
and why. For most consumers, the primary purpose of overdraft 
protection is as liquidity insurance for which there are few real 
substitutes. The service provides convenient short-term credit to 
ensure the payment of current obligations (avoiding bounced checks 
and the like), paid back in a short period of time, and used as an 
alternative to maintaining low-interest precautionary balances in 
savings and checking accounts that can be accessed at the point of 
sale without a credit card. And even though some consumers use 
overdraft protection frequently, there is no evidence that they would 
be made better off if their choices were restricted. Based on 
currently available evidence, the defining characteristic of frequent 
overdraft users is not, as regulators would suggest, low or fixed 
income, but rather a low credit score and poor credit history, which 
results in a paucity of attractive alternatives.8 
Although overdraft protection is relatively more expensive than 
many mainstream financial products (such as credit cards), there is 
no evidence that overdraft protection is systematically more 
expensive relative to the real-world alternatives available to those 
who use it regularly.9 More specifically, although overdraft 
protection may be more expensive than alternatives for some 
consumers, it may also be relatively superior for other consumers. 
This is especially so once the full costs of acquiring credit (including 
                                                                                                     
 8. See infra notes 63–79 and accompanying text. 
 9. It should be stressed at the outset that while the standard measure of 
lending cost—the “Annual Percentage Rate” or APR—might be a somewhat 
useful shorthand for describing the cost of loans, it is practically worthless in 
describing the real cost of a small-dollar, short-term loan such as payday 
lending or overdraft protection, which is a loan for only a few weeks or even 
days. For example, the faster a consumer repays an overdraft loan, the higher 
the APR, and the slower he repays it, the lower the measured APR. This 
suggests the artificiality of APR as a measure of cost in the context of small-
dollar short-term loans. 
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nonfinancial costs such as the time, travel, and convenience) are 
taken into account.  
Overdraft protection also goes hand-in-hand with the 
availability of low minimum-balance, free checking accounts, which 
has provided access to the mainstream financial system for many 
low-income and young families. The rapid rise in the availability of 
free checking from 2001–2009 was aided by the spread of overdraft 
protection, especially automated overdraft protection, as well as the 
increased use of debit cards.10 Instead of the monthly-fee based 
model that dominated consumer banking for decades, the spread of 
overdraft protection opened the doors of the banking system to 
consumers who previously could not afford monthly maintenance 
fees and who were thus excluded from the banking system. And 
while substitution of fixed monthly fees with overdraft fees has 
produced a different pattern of cross-subsidization among bank 
consumers, reducing access to overdraft protection in the name of a 
subjective definition of fairness would reduce the availability of free 
checking accounts and impose new limits on bank access, such as 
higher mandatory minimum balances. 
Finally, although overdraft fees and revenues have increased 
during the past decade, there is no evidence to date that banks are 
earning economic profits or “rents” from the growing use of 
overdraft protection. Instead, the market for overdraft protection is 
competitive both among banks offering overdraft services and with 
comparable products, such as payday lending. There is no evidence 
of super-normal returns to the banking industry generally from the 
growth of overdraft protection.  
In fact, there is clear evidence to the contrary. Although 
overdraft revenues have risen, the costs of retail banking have 
increased as well, due to a range of quality improvements, including 
increased innovation (including online and mobile banking), an 
expansion of free services, and increased banking hours and 
banking days. These quality improvements and service 
improvements have made banking more convenient and accessible 
for consumers and have brought many consumers into the 
mainstream banking system for the first time. These developments 
                                                                                                     
 10. Increased access to free checking began around 1998 but remained 
modest in numbers until access rose dramatically beginning in 2001. See infra 
notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  
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were spurred by the need to “keep up” in the highly competitive 
retail banking marketplace and reflect the high degree of 
competition in the banking market, a reality that makes it highly 
implausible that banks could earn sustainable economic profits that 
are not competed away. The decline in access to free checking in 
response to the Federal Reserve’s imposition of regulations on 
overdraft protection in 2009 evidences the market’s competitiveness 
and that, where revenues fall and costs rise, those costs are passed 
through to consumers.11 Absent any evidence of sustainable 
economic profits in this sector of the banking industry, regulations 
that limit revenues from overdraft protection or any other service 
will have to be made up elsewhere through new and increased 
banking fees or substantial reduction in retail banking services and 
quality. There is no reason to believe that this regulatory-induced 
equilibrium outcome would be economically superior to that chosen 
by voluntary choice in a competitive market, especially once these 
other offsetting price and quality adjustments occur. 
Regulatory proposals offered in the name of consumer 
protection can be justified in two ways. Under a theory of 
information failure, it might be argued that consumers simply lack 
sufficient information about the products that they are using, such 
as cost or other elements of the contract. In that case, intervention 
might be justified to improve the flow of information in the market, 
such as requiring standardized disclosure formats, to enable 
consumers to better match their preferences with the products 
available in the marketplace. Substantive regulation of terms, 
however, generally would not be justified under this theory.  
Alternatively, under a theory of paternalism, it might be argued 
that even if information is freely available to consumers, consumers 
should simply be prohibited from making certain choices. 
Regulation grounded in paternalism, however, is much more 
dangerous in the unintended consequences it can produce. It 
overrides consumers’ assessments of their own best interests in light 
of the options they have at any given time with the preferences of a 
bureaucratic agency unfamiliar with the particular context of 
consumer decision-making. Using overdraft protection is usually 
cheaper and more sensible than bouncing payments for utilities, 
rent, credit card accounts, or other bills. Crude and narrow 
                                                                                                     
 11. See infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.  
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measures of cost, such as APR, exclude many of the important total 
costs of obtaining and using credit—time, flexibility, and 
convenience—as well as these other costs of eviction and 
termination of utility service. Taking away overdraft protection or 
making it less useful and flexible for consumers and financial 
institutions will likely result in consumer harm in terms of more 
dishonored payments, utility service shut-offs, evictions, and other 
hardships, as well as more time and travel wasted in order to 
borrow relatively small sums of money. 
II. Overdraft Protection: Background 
A. The History of Overdraft Protection 
Traditionally, American consumers had three primary forms of 
payment available to them: cash, checks, and more recently, credit 
cards. The advent and rapid spread of debit cards has added an 
additional payment system, one which has highlighted the question 
of overdraft fees because of the perception that debit cards and ATM 
machines are unusually prone to triggering “unfair” overdraft 
charges. 
When using cash, a consumer bears no risk of overdrawing his 
account because he is limited to the cash he has on hand. On the 
other hand, cash is inconvenient and time-consuming to obtain. The 
consumer also bears the risk associated with its loss or theft. Many 
consumers are reluctant to carry large amounts of cash with them 
or to make frequent trips to the bank to obtain cash. This in turn 
creates a liquidity constraint for consumers who use cash because 
they lack sufficient cash on hand and thus may be unable to take 
advantage of a retailer’s sale or purchase goods or services in an 
emergency. Cash generally is not used to make larger purchases, 
and some merchants will not accept large-denomination bills. 
Moreover, cash can only be used for face-to-face transactions and 
cannot be used to pay bills by mail. Accessing large amounts of cash 
may also arouse suspicion with law enforcement authorities. And 
while ATMs make it easier to obtain and use cash than in prior 
eras, there is still a substantial cost in terms of time and 
inconvenience from ATM visits. Consumers can reduce those costs 
by making more infrequent ATM visits, but that requires 
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withdrawing and carrying a larger amount of cash per transaction, 
which raises problems of loss or theft. Using out-of-network ATMs 
reduce the transaction costs of obtaining cash but usually incurs 
fees. Using ATMs to withdraw cash can also create a risk of 
overdrafting one’s account. 
Checks are an ancient response to all of these limits on the 
usefulness of cash. Checks solve many of the problems inherent in 
cash by enabling parties to transfer funds among themselves 
through bank drafts rather than physically. But checks create new 
problems of their own because the payment order is separated in 
time from the actual payment. Even if there were sufficient funds in 
the account at the time the check was written, there might not be at 
the time the check clears. This gives rise to the well-known danger 
that a check might “bounce” and be returned for insufficient funds. 
In fact, because of bounced check risk, delay in settlement, and the 
slowness of checks in the checkout line, many merchants today no 
longer accept checks or do so only under limited, lower-risk 
circumstances. Instead they prefer payment by electronic payment 
systems such as debit cards.12 
Bounced checks can be very costly to consumers. Direct fees 
imposed for checks returned for insufficient funds are substantial. 
For example, a bounced check may lead to fees imposed by both the 
payee as well as the financial institution that may exceed $60 total 
per transaction, an implied APR far higher than for high-cost loans 
such as payday loans.13 Moreover, bounced check fees are 
cumulative—bouncing several checks can result in the imposition of 
substantial fees each time from both the bank and injured 
merchants. Dishonored checks also impose indirect costs. If a check 
is for payment of insurance, the policy will be terminated, and if for 
utilities (such as telephone or electricity) the bounced check may 
                                                                                                     
 12. According to one recent study, 40% of national retail merchants will not 
accept checks for the purchase of goods and services. See Ed Roberts, Average 
Account Overdraft Is $40, But Total Cost Is $58, Study Finds, PAYMENT SOURCE, 
http://www.paymentssource.com/news/account-overdraft-total-cost-study-300753 
2-1.html (last visited February 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 13. See Michael W. Lynch, Legal Loan Sharking or Essential Service? The 
Great “Payday Loan” Controversy, REASON, Apr. 1, 2002, at 38 (noting that bank 
charges for bounced checks have an APR of over 5,000%); see also Michael S. 
Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 155 (2004) (comparing payday 
loans and bounced check fees). 
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lead to termination of service, penalties, and a substantial security 
deposit to reconnect service. Retailers may refuse future service to 
customers who bounce checks. Bounced checks may also result in 
termination of a bank account14 and even a risk of criminal 
prosecution.15 In all, these various penalties may exceed hundreds of 
dollars. Most bounced check occurrences also require physical 
redemption of the check with payment of cash, which is time-
consuming and embarrassing. Bouncing a check is also damaging to 
one’s credit score, making subsequent access to credit even more 
difficult. 
B. The Growth of Overdraft Protection Programs 
Instead of bouncing checks, many banks have instead offered 
overdraft protection, in which a bank advances funds to clear the 
check so that it is not returned. Historically, banks occasionally 
cleared some checks that otherwise would bounce on an ad hoc 
basis. But this courtesy service was highly limited and 
discretionary, reserved for high income customers with short-term 
liquidity problems.16 That overdraft protection traditionally was a 
benefit for high-income customers is relevant for understanding the 
current demographics of overdraft usage: the practice originated as 
a courtesy service for high-income, not low-income, customers. Thus, 
although overdraft protection now has been made available to 
middle-class and lower-income bank customers as well, its origin 
was as a short-term liquidity source for high-income customers. 
Most customers were denied this courtesy and were forced to deal 
with the cost, inconvenience, and potential criminal penalties of 
bounced checks. 
                                                                                                     
 14. According to one news story, at most banks “if you’ve bounced too many 
checks, you’re banned for five to seven years.” Douglas McGray, Check Cashers, 
Redeemed, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2008, at MM36. 
 15. Every state provides for criminal penalties for passing bad checks 
under some circumstances. See, e.g., National Check Fraud Center, Bad Check 
Laws by State, http://www.ckfraud.org/penalties.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(listing the civil and criminal bad check laws of each state) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See Amendments to Regulation E, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,033 (Nov. 17, 
2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (discussing the ad hoc nature of early 
overdraw payments). 
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Over time, access to overdraft protection has grown as 
automated overdraft protection has reduced its cost and risk and 
increased its scale. Automated overdraft protection removed much 
of the subjectivity and selectivity of discretionary overdraft 
protection, mainstreaming access to overdraft protection by using 
automated underwriting and processing systems to control risk and 
cost and increasing the scale of the program to mitigate risk. The 
FDIC found in its 2006 survey of 462 FDIC-supervised banks that 
86% of banks “operated some form of an overdraft program” and 
that 40.5% of all banks offered automated overdraft programs.17 
Among larger banks with over $1 billion in assets, 76.9% offered 
automated overdraft programs.18 Approximately 70% of banks with 
overdraft programs implemented their automated programs after 
2001.19 As the use of ATMs and point-of-sale debit cards increased, 
banks have also extended overdraft protection to those products.20 
As of 2007, the average fee for an overdraft was $26, and larger 
banking institutions charge higher rates on average than smaller 
institutions.21 
                                                                                                     
 17. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT 
PROGRAMS 5 (2008) [hereinafter FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS], 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/FDIC138_Report_ 
Final_v508.pdf (describing the study, which consisted of a general analysis of 
the availability of overdraft programs and a detailed evaluation of the details of 
these individual programs). 
 18. Id. at 5 tbl.III-1. 
 19. Id. at 8 tbl.III-4. 
 20. According to the FDIC study, 81% of banks that operated automated 
overdraft programs allow overdrafts to be paid at ATMs and POS debit card 
terminals. Id. at 9–10, 10 tbl.III-8. 
 21. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-281, BANK FEES: 
FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CUSTOMERS HAVE 
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO OPENING CHECKING OR SAVINGS 
ACCOUNTS 16 (2008) (finding that large institutions, defined as those with assets 
of $1 billion or more, charged higher insufficient funds and overdraft fees on 
average than medium and small institutions, defined as those with less than $1 
billion and $100 million in assets respectively). According to Moebs, banks with 
over $50 billion in assets charge an average of $35 per overdrawn check 
compared to $26 for all institutions. See Press Release, Moebs Services, 
Consumer Overdraft Fees Increase During Recession: First-Time Phenomenon 
(July 15, 2009), [hereinafter Moebs Services, Consumer Overdraft Fees], 
available at http://www.moebs.com/AboutUs/Pressreleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/ 
mid/380/ItemID/65/Default.aspx (finding “Wall Street banks,” defined as 
institutions with assets of more that $50 billion, charged an average of $35 per 
overdraft compared to all financial institutions’ average of $26 per overdraft). 
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Bank revenues from overdraft fees rose from $30 billion in 2005 
to $37 billion in 2009 before slipping back to $35 billion in 2010 as a 
result of new Federal Reserve regulations that reduced the number 
of consumers using overdraft protection.22 Overdraft fees constitute 
a substantial portion of bank revenues and an even larger 
percentage for credit unions.23 According to the FDIC’s 2006 survey, 
overdraft fees on average represent 6% of total net operating 
revenues of FDIC-insured banks.24 It is estimated that 90% of 
overdraft revenues are generated by a relatively small percentage of 
heavy users.25 
This growth in the availability and usage of overdraft protection 
is consistent with consumer preferences. According to a 2009 survey 
by the American Bankers Association (ABA), of those consumers 
who had paid an overdraft fee in the past twelve months, 96% 
wanted the payment covered.26 A 2010 survey found that 69% of 
those who paid overdraft fees in the previous twelve months were 
happy that the payment was covered.27 Eight of nine respondents in 
a small focus group conducted by ICF Macro in connection with the 
Federal Reserve’s promulgation of its amendments to Regulation E 
                                                                                                     
 22. Press Release, Moebs Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue Drops to 2008 
Levels for Banks and Credit Unions (Sept. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Moebs 
Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue Drops], available at http://www.moebs.com/ 
Pressreleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/193/Default.aspx. 
 23. See Brian T. Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, Competition and Adverse 
Selection in a Consumer Loan Market: The Curious Case of Overdraft vs. Payday 
Credit 7, 25 tbl.2 (Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.cleveland 
fed.org/research/conferences/2010/9-9-2010_household-finance/Melzer_Morgan_ 
2_16_2010.pdf (noting that overdraft revenue was 17.6% of net operating income 
for banks and 60.4% of net operating income for credit unions). 
 24. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at iii–iv. 
 25. Moebs Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue Drops, supra note 22; see also 
FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at iv (finding that 
customers with five or more Not Sufficient Funds (NSF) transactions incurred 
93.4% of the NSF fees reported during the study, customers with ten or more 
NSF transactions incurred 84% of all NSF fees, and customers with twenty or 
more NSF transactions paid 68% of all NSF fees). 
 26. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, ABA Survey: More Consumers 
Avoid Overdraft Fees (Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter ABA 2009 Survey], available 
at http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/PR_ConsumerBanking_090909Overdraft 
Survey.htm. 
 27. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, ABA Survey: Most Customers Avoid 
Overdraft Fees (Sept. 15, 2010) [hereinafter ABA 2010 Survey], available at 
http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/091510ConsumerOverdraftSurvey.htm. 
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said that they would keep their overdraft coverage, even if it meant 
that they triggered overdraft fees, because they wanted the 
important transactions to go through.28 The vast majority of 
overdraft customers, therefore, self-report that they are happy that 
overdraft protection was available to cover their payments. 
C. Risk of Overdraft Protection to Banks 
The risk to banks of offering overdraft protection is nontrivial 
but reasonable. The historical charge off rate for overdraft loans is 
between 3% and 5%, comparable to the rate on many other 
unsecured bank loans such as credit cards.29 Between 2001 and 
2005, banks closed 30 million bank accounts for recidivist check 
bouncing.30 And the average loss per bad account was $310.31 In the 
one-year period between October 2009 and October 2010, for 
example, according to data provided, one bank charged-off 53,588 
overdraft accounts for a total of $18,733,457.32 Even if every 
overdraft or non-sufficient funds (NSF) charge generated $30 in 
pure profit with no cost of provision, therefore, it would be necessary 
to process ten repaid overdrafts for every account that went bad. 
According to data provided by one regional bank, the largest 
loss risk for financial institutions from overdraft programs is not 
those customers who overdraft repeatedly, although this seems to be 
a particular concern of the FDIC. Instead, the largest risk arises 
from low-use or “hit-and-run” customers who open an account with 
the minimum required balance, conduct several overdrafts in short 
succession and then abandon the account.33 The bank’s largest 
                                                                                                     
 28. Macro Int’l Inc., Review and Testing of Overdraft Notices 8–9 (Dec. 8, 
2008) (unpublished report), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/press/bcreg/bcreg20081218a6.pdf. 
 29. Letter from Richard R. Riese, Senior Vice President, Am. Bankers Ass’n 
to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 4 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/OCCGuidanceLetter8411.pdf. 
 30. Dennis Campbell, Asis Martinez-Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out 
of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account 
Closures (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1335873 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 62. 
 32. IBC Bank, chart presenting charge off analysis for 2009–2010 (Oct. 
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. IBC Bank, chart expressing losses from overdrafts for 2010 (Dec. 31, 
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losses on its overdraft program are from new accounts less than 
three months old. Although frequent overdraft customers may 
eventually default on an overdraft loan, the fact that they have paid 
prior overdraft fees typically renders them profitable on average. 
For a given bank, for example, the average charge off for free 
checking customers who default on one overdraft in a year is 
$188.78. But the aggregate loss on all customers who default on one 
overdraft is $838,733.80. Moreover, the bank reports that despite its 
best efforts to ascertain risk of new customers, accurate risk 
assessment on overdraft accounts remains elusive. Precisely 
because free checking makes banking available to nontraditional 
customers, it is difficult to predict who among those customers 
eventually will default on overdraft loans. Although the bank uses 
ChexSystem reports (a central reporting service for bounced checks 
and closed bank accounts) to try to predict risk, it provides little 
predictive weight for subsequent default on overdraft loans. The size 
of the first deposit made by a new customer also has no predictive 
value. Nor is account seniority very predictive: As noted, accounts of 
one to three months old are the most at risk for overdraft default 
losses, but older accounts over twenty-four months old also present 
substantial risk of loss. It is actually those who overdraft 
infrequently who present the safety and soundness risk, not those 
who use the product regularly. 
III. The Regulatory Framework 
A. Federal Reserve Regulation 
In 2009, the Federal Reserve promulgated amendments to 
Regulation E, which governs electronic transfers, to place new 
regulations on overdraft fees.34 Under those rules, consumers must 
affirmatively choose to opt-in to overdraft protection for ATM and 
point-of-sale debit transactions. The Federal Reserve’s justification 
for its action was its conclusion that, based on the responses of 
participants in a survey of just six people, “participants generally 
indicated that they would want their checks paid into overdraft” but 
                                                                                                     
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2011) (requiring financial institution to gain 
customers’ opt-in before enrolling them in overdraft plans). 
1156 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141 (2012) 
that the “majority of participants [four of six] also indicated that 
they would prefer an opt-in over an opt-out even if they would 
choose to have ATM and one-time debit card transactions paid.”35  
Even if the responses of this six-person study are generalizable, 
however, the Fed made no determination of the relative cost of opt-
in versus opt-out options on the system as a whole. Thus, if opt-in is 
substantially more expensive to obtain than opt-out would be, it 
might still be more efficient to have an opt-out regime even if many 
consumers would actually choose to opt-out.36 In the context of 
securing consent for banking services such as overdraft protection, it 
is much easier for consumers to contact the bank than for the bank 
to track down consumers, especially those who have to be contacted 
at home. For example, when one large regional bank sought to 
contact its customers to give them the option to opt-in to overdraft 
protection for debit cards and ATM transactions, it was unable to 
contact almost 10% of its customers even after repeated efforts.37 I 
have located no authoritative estimate of the impact of adopting an 
opt-in regime on participation rates in overdraft protection 
                                                                                                     
 35. Amendments to Regulation E, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,036 (Nov. 17, 
2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205); see also Macro Int’l Inc., Design and 
Testing of Overdraft Disclosures: Phase Two 4 (Oct. 12, 2009) (unpublished 
report), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
bcreg20081218a6.pdf (noting that four of the six participants in the first round 
of study that had overdrawn their account in the past would have preferred to 
have the transaction paid, while the other two would have rather had the 
transaction voided). 
 36. For example, even though a majority of consumers arguably would 
choose to opt-out of telemarketing calls through the National-Do-Not-Call 
Registry created by the Federal Trade Commission, it might nonetheless be 
efficient for the rule to be set as an opt-out rather than opt-in rule in light of the 
relative ease by which consumers could opt-out (by adding their phone numbers 
to the list) versus the high cost and difficulty that telemarketers would have to 
incur to contact and persuade consumers to opt-in. See Todd Zywicki, Comment 
to Two New FTC Commissioners and the National Do-Not-Call Registry, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 14, 2004, 4:28 PM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
posts/1092515307.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (arguing that the National 
Do-Not-Call Registry is an efficient contractual default property right—that of 
telemarketers being able to call potential customers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Comment of Int’l Bancshares Corp. to the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 6 
(Sept. 24, 2010) (noting that IBC attempted to contact 367,355 customers and 
was unable to reach 31,369 (8.5%) of those even after numerous attempts in 
many different ways), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
laws/publiccomments/overdraft_comments/2010-09-24-ibc.pdf. 
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programs, but news reports indicated that participation has 
declined. About 20% of banks increased the fee that they charged on 
overdrafts to offset lost revenues from those who opt-out.38 Because 
of the cost and difficulty of contacting consumers, many banks chose 
to not even try to contact customers to solicit their opt-in. This 
included both community banks for whom it was too expensive 
relative to their somewhat smaller customer base as well as very 
large banks with such a large and transient customer base that it 
was financially infeasible to contact them.  
On the other hand, for those who have made the effort to 
contact consumers, a high percentage of consumers chose to opt in, 
and the heaviest users were those most likely to choose to opt in. For 
example, one regional bank solicited opt-in for overdraft protection 
for debit card transactions from its largest overdraft users.39 The 
bank sought permission from 499 customers that had twenty-five or 
more overdraft transactions in 2010. Of the 499 customers, 466 
(93%) opted-in for debit card transactions and thirty-three (7%) 
opted out.40 This willingness of the heaviest users to opt-in to 
overdraft protection suggests that they value access to overdraft 
protection notwithstanding its seemingly high cumulative cost. 
Overall, 73% of the bank’s customers chose to opt-in to debit card 
overdraft protection. A subsequent survey of the bank’s customers 
by the Raddon Financial Group in June 2011 found that, when 
asked to rank the value of overdraft courtesy protection from 
“Extremely valuable” to “Not at all valuable,” 86% of elevated users 
stated that the availability of overdraft protection was extremely 
valuable; only 2% said it was “Not at all valuable.”41 Moreover, the 
percentage of those stating that overdraft protection is “extremely 
valuable” rose consistently with the intensity of use, from 57% for 
non-users of overdraft protection to 86% for elevated users. Overall, 
of 2,009 respondents to the online survey, 71% said that access to 
                                                                                                     
 38. Moebs Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue Drops, supra note 22. In 
addition, opt-in may create an adverse selection problem as low-risk users who 
rarely use the product may be more likely not to opt-in. 
 39. IBC Bank, spreadsheet (2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Raddon Fin. Grp., Inc. Custom Survey Research Findings (June 2011) 
[hereinafter Raddon Research Findings] (on file with Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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overdraft protection is “Extremely valuable,” and another 21% said 
it was “Somewhat valuable.” Only 4% said it was “Not at all 
valuable.” 
Market surveys have suggested similar results. According to a 
survey by Moebs Services, at various large banks 60%–80% of 
customers opted-in to debit card overdraft protection, with a median 
opt-in rate of 75%.42 According to analysis by the ABA, 46% of 
consumers opted-in to overdraft protection for one-time debit card 
and ATM transactions.43 A study by the Center for Responsible 
Lending, by contrast, concluded that 33% opted-in.44  
Perhaps more significantly, Moebs found that almost all of 
those who use overdraft protection regularly—more than ten times 
per year—opted-in to coverage45 and JP Morgan reported that 53% 
of those who regularly use overdraft protection opted in.46 Although 
these surveys and studies are not rigorously scientific, they suggest 
that the most frequent (and thus presumably the most 
knowledgeable) users of the product are those who are also most 
likely to opt-in to overdraft protection when given the choice. As the 
analysts at Moebs Services put it, “The consumer no longer views 
overdrafts as a penalty like a parking ticket, but as a safety net.”47 
The recent experience of one bank is also illustrative with 
respect to overdraft fees at ATMs.48 Between April 7 and April 30, 
2011, the bank had 41,273 customers who were alerted when they 
                                                                                                     
 42. Moebs Services, Overdraft Fee Revenue Drops, supra note 22. 
 43. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Half of Bank Customers Choose 
Overdraft Protection (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.aba.com/Press+ 
Room/083110 OverdraftProtection.htm. 
 44. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BANKS COLLECT OVERDRAFT OPT-INS 
THROUGH MISLEADING MARKETING 2 (2011), available at http://www.responsible 
lending.org/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-OD-Survey-Brief-fi 
nal-2-4-25-11.pdf. 
 45. See Press Release, Moebs Services, Banks Lower Overdraft Fees as 
Consumers Choose to Opt-In (Dec. 8, 2010),[hereinafter Moebs Services, Banks 
Lower Overdraft Fees], available at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/ 
tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/197/Default.aspx (“[A]lmost 100 percent of 
those using overdrafts 10 or more times in a year, and over 50 percent of those 
who never overdraw their account, opted-in for overdraft protection.”). 
 46. David Benoit, Customers Opt for Overdraft Protection, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
26, 2010, at C1. 
 47. Moebs Services, Banks Lower Overdraft Fees, supra note 45. 
 48. IBC Bank, chart presenting overdraft-protection enrollment (2011) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1159 
sought to make an ATM withdrawal which would overdraw their 
account and were asked whether to cancel the transaction or 
continue with an overdraft charge. Of that group, only 3,380 (8%) 
initially declined to have the transaction processed with an 
overdraft fee. Of that group of 3,380 who initially declined to have 
the transaction go forward, however, 1,470 (44%) came back within 
twenty-four hours and opted-in to overdraft protection for ATM 
transactions. Within twenty-four hours, therefore, 95% of those who 
were originally given the opportunity to accept overdraft protection 
for an ATM withdrawal did so. 
This real-world experience rebuts one of the proffered 
rationales offered by the Federal Reserve—but one for which it 
offers no evidence or even serious theoretical support—that opt-in 
would protect frequent users of overdraft protection from overusing 
the product.49 According to the Federal Reserve, requiring opt-in 
would make it more difficult for these consumers to access overdraft 
protection, which “could therefore best prevent these consumers 
from entering into a harmful cycle of repeated overdrafts.”50 But 
experience shows that heavier users of overdraft protection are 
those who are most likely to opt-in to overdraft protection. Standard 
economic analysis provides a straightforward explanation for this 
observation: regular users of overdraft protection are those who are 
most likely to be aware of its costs and to choose to use overdraft 
protection because they believe it to be superior to their available 
alternatives. Consistent with standard economic analysis, and 
contrary to the Federal Reserve’s paternalistic approach, making 
overdraft protection more expensive and less available to the 
heaviest users is almost certainly likely to reduce their welfare and 
to impose unnecessary costs on the financial institution in order to 
reach the desired end by consumers and banks. Restriction has 
proven to just add cost with no obvious benefits to those that are 
supposedly being protected. 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Amendments to Regulation E, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,038 (Nov. 17, 
2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (noting that the majority of overdraft 
revenue comes from “a small portion of customers who frequently overdraw 
their account”). 
 50. Id. On March 1, 2010, the Federal Reserve promulgated additional 
amendments to Regulation E clarifying some questions raised by the prior 
rulemaking. 2010 Amendments to Regulation E, 75 Fed. Reg. 9120 (proposed 
Mar. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
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B. FDIC Guidance 
On November 24, 2010, the FDIC issued guidance regarding 
overdraft fees.51 Under the FDIC guidance, financial institutions 
must take several steps regarding their overdraft accounts. Among 
its requirements, banks must “monitor [customer] accounts” and 
“take meaningful and effective action to limit use by customers” of 
overdraft protection.52 For example, the guidance provides that, 
with respect to “excessive or chronic” users of overdraft protection—
defined as those who overdraw their accounts on more than six 
occasions in a rolling twelve-month period—the bank must take 
affirmative steps to provide the customer with a reasonable 
opportunity to choose a less costly alternative, such as linked 
savings account overdraft protection or a line of credit.53 Banks are 
required to institute “appropriate daily limits” on overdraft fees and 
consider eliminating overdraft fees for transactions that overdraw 
an account by a “de minimis” amount.54 Finally, banks are required 
to “not process transactions in a manner designed to maximize the 
cost to consumers,”55 which has been interpreted to prohibit posting 
larger items first.56 
                                                                                                     
 51. See FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE, supra note 4 
(providing guidance to financial institutions regarding their automated 
overdraft payment plans). 
 52. Id. at 1. 
 53. Since the initial announcement of the Guidance the FDIC has clarified 
that this requirement can be satisfied by a statement on a customer’s monthly 
statement. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Overdraft Payment Program 
Supervisory Guidance Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/overdraft/FAQ.html (last visited December 
26, 2011) (stating that providing an “enhanced periodic statement” would satisfy 
the bank’s affirmative requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying 
Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft 
Fees (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17028, 2011) (finding 
that mention of overdrafting, or topics consumers associate with overdrafting, 
significantly decreases overdrafting by the consumer) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 1. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Overdraft Payment Program 
Supervisory Guidance Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/overdraft/FAQ.html (last visited December 
26, 2011) (stating that transactions should be processed in a neutral manner, 
and not one that maximizes fees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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C. OCC Guidance 
In June 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) also issued proposed “Guidance on Deposit-Related Credit 
Products.”57 The OCC guidance describes several principles that the 
OCC expects national banks to follow in connection with any 
deposit-related consumer credit product, specifically automated 
overdraft protection programs and deposit advance products. The 
OCC contends that the purpose of its program is to provide “a high 
degree of flexibility” for banks to “structure and operate their 
programs in a prudent and safe and sound manner” that also 
“provides for fair treatment of customers without dictating specific 
product terms.”58 Although the rules purport to be only guidance 
and not to impose specific prescriptive requirements, it is likely to be 
interpreted as dictating specific requirements. 
The OCC’s guidance imposes several different requirements. 
First, it requires disclosure not only of the terms of the overdraft 
protection program offered but also of any alternative deposit-
related credit products offered by the bank (such as tied savings 
protection). The OCC guidance also requires banks to provide 
customers with clear disclosure about the order of processing 
transactions as well as to inform consumers that the order in which 
transactions are processed can affect the total amount of fees 
incurred.59 Second, the OCC rules urge banks to adopt an opt-in 
approach for all overdraft protection products, including checks, 
ACH, and recurring debit card transactions. Unlike overdraft 
protection for one-time debit transactions and ATM transactions (for 
which consumer testing conducted by the Federal Reserve suggested 
about half of consumers preferred to be opt-in), available evidence 
clearly indicates that an overwhelming majority of consumers want 
overdraft protection for these larger and more important 
transactions, so requiring opt-in seems like an unnecessary 
logistical hurdle. Third, pursuant to safety and soundness 
requirements, the OCC guidance requires the bank to conduct 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 57. See OCC, Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 
Fed. Reg. 33,409 (proposed June 8, 2011) (proposing regulation on automatic 
overdraft protection and direct deposit advance programs). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
1162 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141 (2012) 
sufficient analysis to ensure that the customer will be able to 
manage and repay the credit obligations arising from the product.60 
Fourth, the OCC requires banks to adopt “prudent programmatic 
limitations” on the usage of overdraft protection in terms of the 
number of overdrafts and the total amount of fees that may be 
imposed per day and per month and any de minimis levels.61 
D. Rationales for Regulation 
To date, regulation of overdraft protection has been grounded in 
purported safety and soundness concerns. But safety and soundness 
concerns are obviously misplaced. The provision of overdraft 
protection is a net financial asset to banks that provide it—there is 
no evidence that banks lose money from it. Individual overdraft 
loans are quite small, just a few hundred dollars or up to $1,000. In 
addition, regulators have claimed that there is an undefined 
“reputation risk” from overdraft protection, a completely 
unsubstantiated assertion and hard to square with the market 
trend toward greater availability of overdraft protection for 
customers. Those who use overdraft protection most regularly—who 
regularly borrow and repay overdraft loans—provide the smallest 
safety and soundness risk, as they are the customers most likely to 
generate revenues from overdraft loans that exceed the costs or risk 
of loss to the bank. Thus, although safety and soundness regulation 
has focused on heavier users of overdraft protection as presenting 
particular risk, this focus is obviously nonsensical from a traditional 
safety and soundness perspective.  
Overdraft programs are highly effective from a risk mitigation 
perspective because of their large scale and small dollar exposure 
per account, i.e., a large number of accounts with small average 
balance. Ironically, safety and soundness can become a real concern 
if regulators continue to carve away at the revenues generated from 
overdraft programs, thereby subjecting banks to greater and greater 
exposure from declining revenues, a reduction in the scale of the 
program that would spread the risk across a smaller number of 
customers, and heightened risk of adverse selection. When 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 33,411. 
ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1163 
combined with the negative impact of the Durbin Amendment on 
interchange fee revenue, excessive interference with overdraft 
protection could imperil the solvency of the retail banking system as 
it exists today, producing its own safety and soundness concerns and 
eventually leading to a major restructuring and retrenchment in 
retail banking.  
At bottom, purported safety and soundness concerns actually 
appear to be poorly disguised consumer protection concerns. One 
suspects that the concern of bank regulators is not that banks will 
lose too much money from the issuance of overdraft protection 
thereby imperiling safety and soundness, but rather that banks will 
make too much money on the product which many activists believe 
to be an undesirable product for consumers, notwithstanding their 
decision to use it. It is precisely because overdraft protection is 
profitable that it is criticized. 
Unlike purported safety and soundness rationales which are 
completely backward, consumer protection at least provides a 
coherent (although questionable) rationale for heightened regulation 
of overdraft protection. But without understanding who uses 
overdraft protection and why, regulation runs a serious threat of 
imposing greater cost than benefit in the form of unintended 
consequences. 
IV. Consumer Protection and Overdraft Regulation 
A. Who Uses Overdraft Protection? 
The overwhelming majority of bank customers in the United 
States never use overdraft protection. According to the FDIC, in 
2006, 75% of bank customers never overdrew their bank accounts 
and 12% overdrew only one to four times.62 A 2009 survey by the 
ABA found that 83% of consumers did not overdraft their account 
during the past year and that, of the 17% who did overdraw, 74% 
used overdraft protection four or fewer times.63 A 2010 ABA survey 
found that 77% of consumers paid no overdraft fees, and of those 
who did, 68% paid four or fewer.64 Melzer and Morgan found that 
                                                                                                     
 62. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at iv. 
 63. ABA 2009 Survey, supra note 26, at 51. 
 64. ABA 2010 Survey, supra note 27, at 52. 
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86% of bank customers take out fewer than four overdrafts per 
year.65 On the other hand, some bank customers use overdraft 
protection dozens of times over the span of a year or two and incur 
hundreds of dollars in overdraft fees as a result. 
As noted earlier, overdraft protection traditionally was used 
by high-income consumers to address short-term liquidity 
problems. Even though the customer base eligible for overdraft 
protection has broadened, most still use overdraft protection to 
meet short-term liquidity needs—even if sometimes recurrent 
liquidity issues—rather than as a source of long-term borrowing. 
According to data provided by a major regional bank, 
approximately one-third of all overdraft loans are repaid within 
ten days and approximately 90% are paid off within a month of the 
initial credit extension.66 
It is often asserted that overdraft fees are used to prey on low-
income consumers.67 A study by Moebs Services research firm, 
however, concludes that the only accurate predictor of the 
propensity to overdraft is credit score—those with lower credit 
scores are more likely to use overdraft protection.68 All other 
demographic information—including income—is non-predictive of 
the likelihood of using overdraft protection, and building a reliable 
risk model has proven elusive.69 
Economist Marc Fusaro also finds that among frequent users 
of overdraft protection there is little correlation between income 
and overdraft usage: high-income individuals are just as likely as 
lower-income individuals to overdraft, but higher-income 
customers’ overdrafts typically are larger.70 Frequent users of 
                                                                                                     
 65. See Melzer & Morgan, supra note 23, at 25 tbl.1 (finding that 75% of 
depositors incur no overdraft loans and 12% of depositors incur one to four 
overdraft loans).  
 66. IBC Bank, spreadsheet indicating month-by-month overdraft loan 
repayment (2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at iv 
(finding that 38% of low-income customers had at least one NSF transaction). 
 68. Press Release, Moebs Services, Who Uses Overdrafts? (Sept. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ 
ItemID/194/Default.aspx. 
 69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (finding that the largest risk 
of loss from overdraft programs is “hit-and-run” customers, not those who 
overdraft repeatedly). 
 70. Marc Anthony Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis of 
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overdraft protection also tend to be younger than less-frequent 
users.71  
The FDIC study found that accounts held by customers in low-
income geographic areas are more likely to incur overdraft charges 
and that use of overdraft protection is more common among younger 
bank customers than others. For example, according to the FDIC’s 
2006 study, 46.4% of those in the 18–25 age range overdrew their 
account, while only 12.2% of seniors did.72 But the FDIC study did 
not control for credit score, which tends to be correlated with income 
and age, thus it cannot be determined whether the driving factor 
was creditworthiness or demographic variables.73  
There are other reasons to think that overdraft customers are 
not particularly poor. By definition, overdraft borrowers have a 
bank account, which distinguishes them from many unbanked 
consumers and suggests that they have higher and more stable 
income than users of alternative financial products such as payday 
lending and pawnshops. Moreover, access to overdraft protection is 
commonly linked to direct deposit of payroll checks, suggesting that 
many overdraft customers are also steadily employed. Finally, recall 
that overdraft protection was originally a benefit offered to high-
income customers so there is no reason to presume that it is a 
product exclusively or even primarily for low-income customers. 
Thus, according to available research, the significant 
distinguishing feature of heavy overdraft users appears to be their 
credit score, not their income or other demographic status. After all, 
overdraft fees can be entirely avoided through responsible financial 
management. One regional bank found, for example, that 71% of its 
free checking accounts with average balances of less than $250 
incurred no overdraft fees in the one year period between October 
2009 and October 2010 (a total of 105,000 accounts).74 Moreover, the 
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 74. IBC Bank, chart presenting overdraft-fee charges for 2009–2010 (Oct. 
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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percentage of low-balance accounts that incurred zero overdraft fees 
during that period (71% of all accounts) was actually higher than 
the overall percentage of all accounts at the bank that incurred no 
overdraft fees (62%).75 Those who are financially responsible can 
and do manage even low balance accounts without triggering 
overdraft fees. Because of their paternalistic focus on protecting 
irresponsible consumers from overdraft fees, however, regulators 
have implicitly assumed that overdraft fees are a function of income 
and have overlooked the important role of consumer responsibility 
in avoiding overdraft fees. 
Infrequent users of overdraft protection exhibit distinct 
patterns of behavior. Fusaro finds those who overdraft generally 
only occasionally make overdrafts that are much larger in size than 
those who overdraft frequently.76 He finds that the average 
overdraft size for those who overdraft occasionally (one to ten times 
in his study)  is $306, as compared with $90 for those who overdraft 
chronically (over one hundred overdrafts).77 This might be explained 
in several ways. It is consistent with the hypothesis that infrequent 
overdraft users use overdraft protection to ensure payment of large 
and important checks, such as for utilities, mortgage payments, 
rent, or the like. If this is so, it seems unlikely that these occasional 
users are simply being tripped up by inadvertent use of their debit 
cards, rather than choosing to use overdraft to clear large and 
important payment obligations.78 Alternatively, it might reflect 
usage by “hit-and-run” scammers who open a bank account and 
exploit overdraft protection in several short-term transactions that 
they never intend to repay. 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. 
 76. See Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans, supra note 70, at 259. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Note that this feature also makes the requirement of opt-in for checks, 
ACH transactions, and recurrent debit card payments extremely cumbersome 
and counterproductive for infrequent users, as those most likely to use it for 
that purpose may be the least likely to anticipate their subsequent need for it 
and thus to opt-in. 
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B. Why Consumers Use Overdraft Protection 
Overdraft protection usually serves as a short-term source of 
small-dollar credit in order to meet a pressing need for funds and to 
prevent important payments such as utilities, rent, or other bills 
from being denied for insufficient funds. Moreover, those who use 
overdraft protection do so because it is better than available 
alternatives. For many, the closest real-world alternative to 
overdraft protection is payday lending. Other sources of credit are 
either unavailable (such as credit cards), clearly inferior (such as 
pawnbrokers), or unwanted because they are longer term or require 
borrowing larger amounts of money than desired (such as personal 
finance company installment loans). According to research by Moebs 
Services, about 19 million Americans use payday lenders and 13 
million use overdraft protection every year.79 Both are popular 
products with significant market demand. How then do consumers 
choose between payday loans and overdraft protection—and do they 
do so rationally?80 
For most consumers, both payday lending and overdraft 
protection are fairly expensive compared to mainstream credit 
offerings such as credit cards.81 This is to be expected: 
fundamentally it is and always has been the case that the cost of 
making small loans to consumers is high relative to the size of the 
loan. And these costs are reflected in a variety of forms—fees, 
interest rate, time, search costs, convenience, and many others. For 
example, even if a consumer could shop around and find a slightly 
lower rate for a payday loan than an overdraft loan, doing so would 
incur time and “shoe leather” costs of searching around, the risk of 
being rejected for the loan, or having to process paperwork and wait 
                                                                                                     
 79. Press Release, Moebs Services, Payday Loans are a Better Deal for 
Consumers than Overdraft Fees (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter Moebs Services, 
Payday Loans], available at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/ 
Details/mid/380/ItemID/169/Default.aspx. 
 80. Available evidence indicates that consumers generally use payday loans 
rationally. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday 
Lending 9–11 (George Mason U. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 09–28, 2009) 
(discussing why consumers take out payday loans) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 81. Credit cards are not always a less expensive alternative than payday 
lending or overdraft protection for those whose usage tends to trigger 
substantial behavior-based fees. 
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for the money. Many of these costs (such as the time spent traveling 
from store to store, paperwork time, and approval delays) are 
incurred regardless of the size of the loan and thus are especially 
costly in relation to the small size of these loans. Similarly, many of 
the costs of making small loans such as store rent, employee time, 
paperwork, and credit checks are expensive to amortize over small, 
risky loans of a few hundred dollars. In light of these basic 
economics, there simply is no foundation for thinking that the total 
cost of overdraft loans is exorbitant when compared to alternatives. 
High price relative to the size of the loan is simply inherent in small 
loans. But even then, many of the real costs of a small loan are not 
directly financial at all but include a variety of transaction costs in 
terms of time, effort, and convenience, none of which is captured in a 
crude and limited measure of cost such as APR, and which generally 
are invariant of loan size. 
Payday and overdraft loans share these fundamental economic 
characteristics that explain why their prices seem high. But payday 
loans and overdraft protection also differ in several significant ways. 
First, payday loans are less convenient and flexible than traditional 
overdraft loans, including the time and “shoe leather” costs of going 
to a payday lender, waiting in line, and then delivering the cash to a 
bank or to pay a bill. In fact, payday loans might not even be 
realistically available in some situations, such as when traveling or 
in an emergency.  
Overdraft protection, by contrast, is processed automatically 
and immediately, twenty-four hours a day from anywhere in the 
world, and can be directly triggered by retail or online transactions 
rather than having to make a special trip to acquire the funds from 
a payday lender. Consumers who place a higher value on their time 
or convenience might therefore prefer using overdraft protection 
rather than going to a payday lender even if payday lending is less 
expensive. Second, there is a possible psychological cost of payday 
loans for some consumers in that they might feel embarrassed to be 
seen patronizing a payday lending storefront or otherwise 
uncomfortable with going to a payday lending store. However, 
overdraft protection is done privately, instantaneously, and 
electronically so there is no concern about outsiders becoming aware 
of their borrowing.82 Third, although the fees may be high relative to 
                                                                                                     
 82. For example, the upper-income professionals for whom overdraft 
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the amount borrowed, overdraft protection in fact permits the 
consumer to borrow exactly the amount needed (plus the fee), no 
more and no less. Moreover, overdraft loans must be paid back 
within forty-five days or the account will be terminated.  
For payday loans, by contrast, consumers may be tempted to 
borrow more than they need for immediate purposes and while the 
overwhelming majority of payday loan customers benefit from and 
value the option to revolve their payday loan at the end of the loan 
period, this can lead some borrowers to fall into a “debt trap” of 
rolling over payday loans or credit card balances.83 Thus, if 
consumers fear their inability to pre-commit to timely repayment, 
they might prefer overdraft protection. Finally, consumers who have 
defaulted on a payday loan simply may find themselves unable to 
acquire payday-loan credit in the future—so payday loans may no 
longer be an available option. For those consumers, overdraft 
protection may be the best alternative available in a group of 
options limited to pawnshops, auto-title loans, rent-to-own, and 
other options. 
Overdraft protection also benefits consumers by reducing their 
need to maintain precautionary bank account balances, and in fact 
those who have overdraft protection generally hold smaller 
precautionary balances. This is valuable for many consumers 
because checking accounts, especially free checking accounts, often 
pay no interest. Thus, the ability to reduce precautionary balances 
enables consumers to keep more of their funds in less liquid but 
higher earning accounts. 
Overdraft loans also provide a degree of flexibility that many 
other products lack. For example, when overdraft protection is 
combined with a debit card it can be used functionally like a credit 
card (albeit an expensive credit card), allowing purchases to be 
made immediately with payment to come later. Because overdraft 
can be used to pay bills, it can also be used to protect access to other 
types of credit, such as utilities, medical treatment, credit cards, or 
even payday lending, as overdraft can be used to make sure those 
payments are honored and thus to avoid costly penalties and 
                                                                                                     
protection originally was created might be unwilling to patronize payday 
lenders or other storefront small-loan lenders. 
 83. See generally Nathalie Martin, Themed Issue: Financial Products 
1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices 
and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2010). 
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termination of service. For example, the effective APR on a bounced 
check is many times higher than for overdraft or payday loans once 
all fees are assessed; and this does not even include the threat of 
criminal prosecution and bank account termination. A simple 
financial measure of cost, such as APR, does not include the value of 
maintaining access to other types of credit or avoiding the costs 
associated with not performing on them. 
In addition, although payday loans are often less expensive 
than overdraft fees, this is not always the case. Leaving aside the 
benefits of overdraft protection in terms of convenience, privacy, and 
time and shoe leather costs, there are important differences in the 
pricing scheme that are relevant to understanding consumer 
behavior. Payday loans typically charge $15 for every $100 
borrowed.84 Overdraft loans, by contrast, typically charge a fee of 
$26–$35 regardless of the amount advanced.85 For loans to cover a 
single small expense of $100 or less, therefore, payday loans are 
typically less expensive than overdraft loans.86 For loans of about 
$200, the price is about equal, and for loans of $300 or above, a 
single overdraft loan typically will be less expensive. This 
calculation will vary, of course, depending on whether the consumer 
is making one overdraft or more. But that is precisely the point—
freedom of contract is most likely to be more efficient than 
regulation when consumer preferences are heterogeneous and 
knowledge of one’s needs is highly personal. 
In fact, evidence indicates that consumers generally act 
rationally when choosing between payday and overdraft credit. 
Federal Reserve economists Brian T. Melzer and Donald P. Morgan 
have studied consumer decision-making with respect to the choice 
between payday lending and overdraft protection.87 They note that 
the key difference in the way the two products are priced generates 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Moebs Services, Payday Loans, supra note 79 (“Consumers who use 
a payday advance loan for $100 or less will pay an average of $17.97.”). 
 85. See Moebs Services, Consumer Overdraft Fees, supra note 21 (stating 
that overdraft charges “range from a first-time charge of $25 up to a $35 charge 
per incident”). 
 86. See Moebs Services, Payday Loans, supra note 79 (explaining that 
“[c]onsumers who use a payday advance loan for $100 or less will pay an 
average of $17.97, which is 33 percent less than the $27.01 it costs for an 
overdraft of that same amount from a checking account”). 
 87. See Melzer & Morgan, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that overdraft and 
payday lending are often claimed to be substitutes). 
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predictions about rational consumer behavior.88 Because the 
primary price component of overdraft protection is a flat fee 
(irrespective of the size of the overdraft) rather than a periodic 
interest rate, rational consumers would tend to use overdraft 
protection to cover larger transactions that otherwise would be 
declined for insufficient funds.89 The price of payday loans, by 
contrast, is tied to the size of the loan (e.g., $15 per $100 borrowed), 
thus consumers would be predicted to use them to cover smaller 
transactions.90 This pricing difference also creates a potential 
adverse selection problem as consumers select the option that gives 
them the lowest price for any given-sized transaction.91 
Melzer and Morgan’s analysis confirms that consumers 
generally use overdraft and payday lending in the manner predicted 
by economic theory. Moreover, they find that in markets where 
payday loans are available, overdraft attempts and bounced checks 
fall in number (as consumers use payday loans to cover some 
transactions that otherwise might bounce),92 but rise in average 
dollar amounts as payday loans continue to be used to cover larger 
transactions.93 They find further that in markets where payday 
credit is available, banks reduce the availability of “free” checking 
for those accounts without direct deposit, but not those with direct 
deposit.94 This is because the presence of direct deposit is a sort of 
insurance for the bank against “hit-and-run” customers who open an 
account without direct deposit, anticipating large overdrafts that 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. (“[W]e wanted to test whether some borrowers rationally switch 
from overdraft to payday credit when the latter is cheaper.”). 
 89. See id. at 3 (“The median price in 2006 was a flat $27 per event, 
regardless of the size of the overdraft.”). 
 90. See id. (finding that payday loans are cheaper for loans less than $180). 
 91. See id. (explaining that this “selection is adverse to overdraft providers 
in two ways; funding large overdrafts costs more, and if the credit is not repaid, 
lenders lose more”). 
 92. See id. at 17 (“[R]eturned checks rates fall when payday credit is 
available . . . suggest[ing] access to payday credit reduces demand for overdraft 
credit.”). 
 93. See id. at 20 (finding that the final data “indicates that the amount per 
returned check rises when payday lending is permitted”). 
 94. See id. at 20–21 (“We find that banks and other depository institutions 
charge higher overdraft fees and are less likely to offer free checking accounts 
when they compete with payday lenders.”). 
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will never be repaid, and then switch to using payday loans to meet 
short-term credit needs.95 
Economist Jonathan Zinman also found evidence of 
substitution between payday lending and overdraft protection. He 
found that when Oregon imposed a cap on the finance charge that 
could be assessed on payday loans, there was a dramatic drop in the 
number of licensed payday lenders, a short-run deterioration in the 
overall financial condition of Oregon households. There was also 
some evidence that the ban led to an increase in late bill payments 
and a substitution to greater use of overdraft protection by 
consumers.96  
Research by Policis analysts also found a significant 
substitution effect between payday lending and overdraft protection. 
In a survey of Australian payday loan customers, they found that if 
payday loans were not available approximately 20% of payday loan 
customers would make greater use of overdraft protection.97 Those 
who were most likely to shift to use of overdraft protection tended to 
be higher-income and have a greater number of alternative credit 
sources than the average payday loan customers.98 
A survey conducted by the Raddon Financial Group of 
customers of a large regional bank asked customers who used 
overdraft services where they would turn for emergency funds if 
                                                                                                     
 95. See id. at 20 (“With payday credit available, banks may find that at 
least some of their overdraft customers are riskier because they owe payday 
lenders as well . . . [so] banks seem most likely to tighten overdraft coverage 
policies.”). 
 96. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household 
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Phila., Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335438 (finding that “the Cap dramatically 
reduced access to payday loans in Oregon, and that former payday borrowers 
responded by shifting into incomplete and plausibly inferior substitutes . . . 
[including] checking account overdrafts of various types and/or late bills”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 97. See Anna Ellison & Robert Forster, Payday in Australia: A Research 
Study of the Use and Impact of Payday Lending in the Domestic Australian 
Market, POLICIS 1, 92 (2008), available at http://www.policis.com/pdf/ 
International/Payday%20borrowers%20FINAL.pdf (finding that, in the event of 
payday loan restrictions, one in five would turn to overdraft finance). 
 98. See id. (explaining that, if payday lending is eliminated, lower-income 
individuals will have a limited number of options and will divert mostly to 
pawning, while higher-income individuals have more options and will divert 
mostly to revolving credit). 
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they no longer had access to overdraft protection.99 Fifty-three 
percent of “elevated users” of overdraft protection reported that if 
overdraft protection was not available they would “not be able to get 
money,” as opposed to only 16% of non-users.100 While 26% of non-
users of overdraft protection said that they would “use a credit card” 
if overdraft protection were unavailable, only 10% of elevated users 
said they would use a credit card.101 This presumably reflects their 
lack of access to credit cards or that use of a credit card would cause 
them to exceed their credit lines  leading to penalties. Similarly, 
while only 6% of non-users said that they would seek a payday loan 
if overdraft protection was unavailable, 24% of elevated users 
reported that would be their option (the second-highest response 
after “[n]ot able to get money” for elevated users).102 Moreover, while 
56% of non-users said in such situations that they would simply 
transfer the needed money from another account, presumably a 
savings account, only 13% of elevated users said that they would do 
so, presumably reflecting the simple truth that they have no other 
accounts available.103  
Regular users of overdraft protection have low credit quality 
and limited credit alternatives.104 According to the Raddon survey, 
for example, only 7% of elevated users of overdraft protection 
describe their personal assessment of their credit rating as 
“excellent,” while 70% describe their credit rating as “fair” (38%) or 
“poor” (32%).105 By contrast, 74% of non-users of overdraft protection 
describe their credit rating as “excellent” or “good,” and only 9% 
consider their credit rating to be “poor.”106 Thus, reducing access to 
overdraft protection would simply exacerbate the plight of those who 
rely upon it because of the lack of better alternatives. 
Another survey, conducted by Baselice & Associates, Inc., of one 
bank’s customers found similar results.107 According to that study, 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Raddon Research Findings, supra note 41. 
 100. Id. Thirty percent of low users and 39% of moderate users said that 
they would be unable to get money. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Baselice & Assoc., Inc., Banking Survey (Aug. 29–31, 2011) (on file with 
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54% of those who self-identified as having “poor credit” thought that 
overdraft protection was “extremely important,” compared to only 
18% of those who said that they had “excellent credit.”108 When 
asked how upset they would be if overdraft protection was 
eliminated, 62% of those with poor credit said they’d be “extremely 
upset” compared to only 20% of those with excellent credit.109 In 
addition, while 41% of lower-income customers reported that they’d 
be “extremely upset,” 29% of customers with annual incomes over 
$60,000 also said that they would be extremely upset if overdraft 
protection were eliminated.110 
Overdraft protection may be used to cover either unintentional 
errors (e.g., an unknowing lack of funds in one’s bank account) or 
intentionally as a short-term line of credit. Fusaro concludes that 
approximately 79% of overdraft use is the first type: clearing 
payments that otherwise would result in bounced checks.111 The 
remaining 21%, he concludes, is conscious use by consumers of 
overdraft protection as a short-term line of credit.112 Intentional 
overdrafters tend to borrow the money for longer durations, a 
rational strategy in light of the flat-fee pricing scheme, in which the 
fees are front-end loaded. This suggests that many chronic 
overdrafters use overdraft protection intentionally as a short-term 
line of credit and are becoming more sophisticated and 
knowledgeable about the most efficient ways to use overdraft 
protection as they become more experienced.113 
                                                                                                     
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Fusaro, Bounced Check Loans, supra note 70, at 495 (“Predicted 
overdrafts are compared to actual overdrafts to conclude that 79% are explained 
by the model and thus thought to be mistakes due to the stochastic nature of 
household expenditures.”). 
 112. See id. at 500 (“Most likely, some portions of the other fifth of 
overdrafts are intentional loans.”).   
 113. See Marc Anthony Fusaro, Consumers’ Bank Choice and Overdraft 
Volume: An Empirical Study of Bounce Protection Programs (Dec. 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.atu.edu/mfusaro/fusa 
rooverdraftvolume.pdf [hereinafter Fusaro, Consumers’ Bank Choice] (“In my 
model, consumers benefit from overdraft protection because they no longer face 
merchants upset about the bad checks or pay the fees those merchants charge 
for returned checks.”). 
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Overall, Fusaro concludes that, on average, consumers gain a 
surplus of approximately $50 per year, or $2 billion economy wide, 
from the availability of overdraft protection, plus the accompanying 
benefits of avoiding NSF fees and maintaining lower precautionary 
balances.114 Fusaro and Ericson conclude that overdraft protection is 
generally welfare-improving for middle-class bank consumers and 
neutral for low-income consumers.115 They conclude that 
eliminating overdraft protection “through excess regulation would 
hurt the most vulnerable population most, as they have the fewest 
alternatives to maintain necessary liquidity.”116 
C. Do Consumers Understand the Cost of Overdraft Protection? 
Evidence that consumers generally alternate usage of overdraft 
protection and payday loans in a manner consistent with the 
predictions of economic theory also suggests that consumers are 
generally aware of the costs of overdraft protection compared to 
various alternative forms of credit and tend to use those which are 
most efficient in light of the limited options that they have available 
to them.  
The pricing of overdraft protection is simple and seemingly 
transparent. Appendix A is the “Form Overdraft Courtesy Customer 
Disclosure” for one bank’s free checking account.117 As can be readily 
seen, the costs of overdraft protection are clearly disclosed, easily 
understood, and the criteria for available line of credit are plain 
(e.g., whether one has an overdraft account linked to a direct deposit 
account or not). The fees are clear: $29 per overdraft, up to a 
maximum of six charged overdrafts per day (after which additional 
overdrafts within the credit limit are free), and an 18% APR for any 
overdraft loan.118 The bank will not charge any overdraft fees for de 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. (finding that “consumer surplus gain . . . would yield $50 per 
individual and $2 billion economy wide”). 
 115. See Marc Anthony Fusaro & Richard E. Ericson, The Welfare 
Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs, 33 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 55, 71 (2010) 
(“Our analysis indeed indicates that [bounce protection], as currently structured 
and regulated, is an economic welfare-enhancing policy for payers as well as for 
both banks and payees.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See infra Appendix A. 
 118. See id. 
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minimis balances of less than $3.119 The bank also clearly discloses 
its clearing order from highest to lowest for various types of 
charges.120 Finally, it states that if the overdraft is not repaid within 
forty-five days the account will be closed.121 
In short, the bank’s disclosure is clear, concise, and easy to 
understand. Moreover, although overdraft protection has been the 
source of criticism and regulatory scrutiny, it has not been claimed 
that consumers fail to understand the costs or criteria of overdraft 
protection. Instead, criticism has focused on the paternalistic 
rationale that even if consumers fully understand the costs of 
overdraft protection, they nonetheless should not be permitted to 
use it “chronically” or “excessively”—as those terms are defined by 
bank regulators.  
In connection with the Federal Reserve’s amendments to 
Regulation E, Macro International Inc. conducted consumer surveys 
to see if consumers understood standard disclosure forms regarding 
overdraft protection. They found that consumers understand the 
concept of overdraft protection—that the institution will cover its 
customers’ overdrafts for a fee—and that they would be enrolled in 
the service automatically unless they opted-out.122 They also 
understood what would happen when they overdrew their account 
through an ATM, debit card, recurring debit, or check 
transaction.123 Subsequent research confirmed findings that 
consumers are able to understand overdraft programs.124 
Research on payday loans also confirms that payday loan 
customers are generally aware of the cost of payday loans. According 
to Gregory Elliehausen, only 2% of payday-loan customers reported 
that they did not know the finance charge for their most recent new 
payday loan and 94.5% reported finance charges consistent with 
prevailing market prices.125 Those who used payday loans most 
                                                                                                     
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Macro Int’l Inc., supra note 28, at ii. 
 123. Id. at iii. 
 124. ICF MACRO, DESIGN AND TESTING OF OVERDRAFT DISCLOSURES: PHASE 
TWO iii (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/bcreg20091112a4.pdf. 
 125. Gregory Elliehausen, An Analysis of Consumers’ Use of Payday Loans 
36–37 (Jan. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cfsaa.com/ 
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often were also most likely to know the reported APR on their 
loan.126 Whatever concerns have been expressed about payday 
loans, lack of transparency is not one: payday loan pricing is simple 
and easily understood.127 Given the predominantly flat-fee nature of 
overdraft protection, it seems probable that those who use overdraft 
protection, especially those who use the product regularly, are 
aware of its cost as well as available alternatives. Moreover, to the 
extent that consumers are unclear about some terms of overdraft 
protection, their uncertainty relates to specific details, such as the 
fact that the bank is not required to pay an overdraft in some 
situations, not the price charged for an overdraft.128 
V. Overdraft Protection and Free Checking 
A. Overdraft Protection and the Economics of Retail Banking 
The expansion of the availability of overdraft protection has 
also helped to transform the consumer banking system over the past 
decade, especially by spurring rapid growth in the availability of 
free checking and other bank services, increasing innovation, and 
expanding access to bank services for previously excluded 
consumers. The link between overdraft fees and free checking is a 
tight one: overdraft protection is essential for free checking to exist 
for low-balance consumers. Low-balance customers have little 
margin for error in managing their affairs—absent overdraft 
protection, these consumers might bounce checks and other 
payments with great regularity. For low-income consumers, 
overdraft protection essentially serves as a substitute for higher 
required minimum balances or other fees that would be necessary to 
cover the cost and risk of serving these customers. Overdraft 
                                                                                                     
portals/0/RelatedContent/Attachments/GWUAnalysis_01-2009.pdf. 
 126. See id. at 38 (“Awareness of the annual percentage rate positively 
related to the number of payday loans obtained in the last 12 months.”). 
 127. As one news story characterized payday lending terms, “[N]o surprises, 
no hidden fees.” McGray, supra note 14. 
 128. See ICF MACRO, supra note 124, at iii (“When asked whether they 
might still overdraw their account using a debit card transaction even if the 
bank’s standard practice was not to pay these overdrafts, three of seven 
participants in the final round indicated that this was possible.”). 
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protection is a substitute for requiring higher precautionary 
balances as insurance ahead of time that payments will be honored. 
Indeed, the shorthand term “free checking” hardly captures the 
full value to consumers today of a standard demand deposit account. 
In fact, the typical free checking account today includes a bundle of 
valuable services: free debit card usage, free ATM access, free online 
bill payment, free mobile banking, and a host of other services. One 
bank estimates that the value of the products bundled in its free 
checking account is $751 per year.129 The bank makes up the cost of 
providing that bundled service in a variety of ways, one of which is 
through revenue generated by overdraft protection. 
The past decade saw a revolutionary transformation in the 
pricing of bank services, away from the traditional pricing model of 
flat monthly service fees to a combination of free checking and other 
bundled banking services, offset by growing debit card interchange 
and overdraft revenues.130 There is a very close link between the 
spread of overdraft protection and free checking. Although banks 
began mainstreaming free checking in the late-1990s, between 2001 
and 2009 the percentage of accounts at large banks that qualified 
for free checking rose dramatically from 7.5% to 76% and the 
average minimum balance required for free checking fell from $440 
in 2001 to $186 in 2009.131 This growth in access to free checking 
appears to have arisen from two sources: the simultaneous growth 
in the availability of overdraft protection and the rapid increase in 
the use of debit cards and the interchange fee revenues that they 
                                                                                                     
 129. Comment of Int’l Bancshares Corp., supra note 37, at 4. Obviously this 
is an interested estimate, but free checking today includes multiple valuable 
services for which consumers otherwise would have to pay. 
 130. See Stango & Zinman, supra note 53, at 26 (discussing the fact that 
overdraft fees are becoming an increasingly important source of bank profits).  
 131. David S. Evans, Robert E. Litan & Richard Schmalensee, Economic 
Analysis of the Effects of the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Debit Card 
Interchange Fee Regulations on Consumers and Small Businesses 35–36 (Feb. 
22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/SECRS/2011/March/20110308/R-1404/R-1404_030811_69120_621655419027 
_1.pdf. Because of the Durbin Amendment’s price controls on interchange fees 
for large bank customers, free checking had plummeted to only 45% of bank 
accounts in 2011. See Claes Bell, Abracadabra, Free Checking Disappears, 
BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/ 
abracadabra-free-checking-disappears.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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generate.132 Bringing lower-income consumers with lower average 
balances into the banking system also has brought with it greater 
risk that those consumers will bounce checks or otherwise miss 
payments. Absent universal access to overdraft protection, it is 
likely that average minimum balances would be raised and monthly 
fees reimposed. To reduce risk exposure, many financial institutions 
also link the availability of free checking or the size of the available 
overdraft line of credit to a commitment to paycheck direct deposit. 
The reduction in the availability of free checking in the 
immediate period after the Federal Reserve’s amendments to 
Regulation E took effect, illustrates the competitive nature of the 
market. According to Evans, Litan, and Schmalensee, “within days” 
of the Fed’s announcement of its new rules, banks starting scaling 
back access to free checking, imposing new fees, and eliminating 
services for consumers.133 The number of accounts eligible for free 
checking fell eleven percentage points—from 76% in 2009 to 65% in 
2010—a figure that translates to approximately twenty million 
accounts.134 Although some of these adjustments may be 
attributable to other factors, such as the ongoing banking crisis, 
much of this change is attributable to the new restrictions on 
overdraft protection. 
Market experience also suggests that overdraft protection is 
popular with consumers and that bank consumers prefer the 
combination of zero up-front maintenance fees and lower required 
balances with overdraft protection to the traditional model of 
monthly maintenance fees and higher minimum required balances. 
Consumers have tended to migrate to banks that offer overdraft 
protection (and thus lower required monthly fees), which has 
increased the market share of those banks and put competitive 
pressure on competitors to respond.135 Access to overdraft protection 
allows consumers to hold smaller precautionary balances in low-
interest demand deposit accounts, which also leads them to 
overdraft their accounts more often.136 Moreover, an obvious but 
                                                                                                     
 132. See Bell, supra note 131 (“Free checking was essentially subsidized by 
the income from insufficient funds and overdrafts.”). 
 133. Evans, Litan, & Schmalensee, supra note 131, at 40. 
 134. Id. at 46. 
 135. See Fusaro, Consumers’ Bank Choice, supra note 113 (finding that 
“consumers choose depository institutions which offer overdraft protection”). 
 136. See Fusaro, Bounced Check Loans, supra note 70, at 498 (studying the 
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often-ignored point is that consumers can easily avoid paying 
overdraft fees simply by not spending more money than they have in 
their account and can avoid overdraft charges by better financial 
management or by holding larger precautionary balances. Overdraft 
loans are created by the customer, not the bank—the customer 
decides whether to draw on the overdraft line of credit.137 
For example, a Federal Reserve study published in 1999, when 
free checking was still somewhat uncommon, illuminates the 
tradeoff between various types of banking fees. The study found that 
checking accounts that did not require customers to consistently 
maintain a certain minimum balance throughout the month also 
imposed higher fees for various services.138 According to the study, 
for non-interest-bearing accounts (the closest analog to free checking 
today) the average required minimum balance was $348, and the 
average monthly fee was $5.50 if the minimum balance was not 
maintained.139 Moreover, these accounts had additional fees for 
many other services and reduced services generally.140 Although the 
monthly maintenance fee was slightly higher for interest-bearing 
accounts, once the additional fees were considered, bank customers 
with a no-minimum-balance account paid $12.30 each month in 
higher monthly fees (approximately $250 per year) than those who 
maintained a certain minimum balance.141  
Thus, as would be expected in a competitive market, there has 
always been a tradeoff between different bank fees and other 
requirements. The market responses to Regulation E and the 
subsequent market responses to the imposition of the Durbin 
Amendment are consistent with the predictions of the banking 
industry as a competitive market where sustainable economic rents 
are absent. 
                                                                                                     
likelihood of consumers to overdraft their account).  
 137. Recall, for example, that 71% of low-balance free checking accounts at 
one bank never incurred overdraft fees. See supra note 75 and accompanying 
text. 
 138. See Joanna Stavins, Checking Accounts: What Do Banks Offer and 
What Do Consumers Value?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 3, 6 (Mar./Apr. 1999) (finding 
that no-minimum balance accounts impose higher fees for returned checks and 
have higher per-item fees). 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. See id. at 6 (discovering accounts with no minimum balance allow fewer 
free transactions and are more likely to restrict teller service). 
 141. Id. at 8. 
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B. The “Fairness” of Overdraft Fees 
Critics of overdraft protection might argue that even though 
there are no demonstrable economic rents generated by overdraft 
fees, overdraft fees should nonetheless be regulated because they 
are “unfair.” “Fairness,” of course, is an entirely subjective and 
arbitrary concept. To the extent that the term has any meaning in 
this context, it appears to express a concern that the actual 
operation of overdraft fees results in a cross-subsidization by some 
consumers by others, as the minority of bank customers who pay 
overdraft fees sustain the provision of free services, innovation, and 
expanded service for the larger number of those who do not. 
The vast majority of bank consumers pay zero or few overdraft 
fees, meaning that they gain access to bank accounts at very low 
cost.142 Moreover, the FDIC estimates that those customers who 
conducted one to four NSF transactions during the prior year were 
charged, on average, $64 in NSF fees—or approximately $5 per 
month—less than that person would have been expected to pay in 
monthly bank fees prior to the spread of overdraft protection.143 
Even a consumer with five to nine NSF transactions paid on 
average $215 year, or about $15 per month.144 In addition, of course, 
the consumer avoided ancillary costs of bounced checks, late fees on 
other bills, etc. On the other hand, the bulk of overdraft fees are 
accumulated by heavy users of the product, but presumably they are 
most aware of the cost and the alternatives available to them and 
find it most necessary to use overdraft protection in light of 
available alternatives. 
Is it “unfair” that most bank customers benefit from this system 
by receiving valuable bank services at low or zero costs, while bank 
customers who pay substantial overdraft fees appear to pay fees in 
excess of what they receive in exchange? As an initial matter, 
economics establishes that because those who use overdraft 
protection do so voluntarily their behavior establishes that in fact 
they do receive value in excess of what they pay, albeit value not 
entirely in direct banking services but in convenience and avoidance 
of higher alternative costs. 
                                                                                                     
 142. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 143. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at iv. 
 144. Id. 
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The claim of unfairness founders on another conceptual 
problem: consumer cross-subsidies are ubiquitous in the modern 
economy, yet few people consider most of these cross-subsidies to be 
“unfair” in some way. For example, customers who purchase items 
on sale or with a coupon pay less than those who do not. Some 
consumers pay more to buy a book in hardback when it is first 
released while others are more patient and buy it at much cheaper 
paperback prices. Those who pay full price for movies subsidize 
those who attend matinee showings. Indeed, those who buy on sale 
or with coupons are typically commended for being thrifty and 
responsible shoppers, although this means that they are being 
effectively subsidized by those who pay full price. That some bank 
consumers subsidize free checking for others through overdraft fees 
seems no more unfair than consumers who pay full price or attend 
full-priced movies, thereby subsidizing others who are patient and 
buy on sale. It cannot be contended that the simple existence of 
consumer cross-subsidies in the retail economy is inherently unfair, 
yet it is difficult to understand what else the “fairness” critique of 
overdraft fees could mean. 
Banking services are no exception to this rule. Today, banks 
offer a wide variety of services (many of them provided for free), but 
all of those are funded by a relatively small number of revenue 
streams. Different customers use different services supported by 
these streams and few consumers would prefer that every service be 
priced in an a la carte manner.145 For example, some consumers 
physically go into branches to conduct transactions, thereby using 
the rent, heat, and employee time that others do not. Yet no banks 
of which I am aware charge a fee for those who use a teller window, 
even though those who do not use tellers are forced to subsidize 
those who do. Nor have bank regulators sought to prohibit this 
“unfair” cross-subsidization of those who use tellers.  
Similarly, banks that offer free parking or drive-through 
banking subsidize those who drive rather than walk or take public 
transportation. Similarly, some customers use online bill-pay or 
other services that are offered for free as part of a bundle of products 
and others do not. Banks offer all of these “free” services as a 
                                                                                                     
 145. Similarly, few consumers seem to prefer paying separate baggage fees 
for checked bags on every flight rather than having those fees bundled into the 
price of their ticket. 
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bundle—debit cards, tellers, heat, free parking, drive-through 
windows, online banking, and a myriad of other services—even 
though they result in cross-subsidies because of competition and 
customer demand. There is simply no sound policy justification for 
the arbitrary assertion that the only appropriate pricing scheme for 
banking services is one that is a la carte and that bundling services 
or cross-subsidizing consumers as competitive circumstances 
demand is a fundamentally flawed pricing scheme. Even more 
unsustainable is the notion that every one of these other cross-
subsidies is “fair” and permissible and that overdraft protection 
alone is arbitrarily condemned on this ground. 
In fact, like all of these other market-driven cross-subsidies, the 
expansion of overdraft and the accompanying increase in access to 
free checking and other innovations is the product of competition 
among banks that has benefited consumers overall. For example, as 
free checking has expanded over the past decade so have the 
number of bank branches nationwide, the number of services 
offered, and banking hours.146 The number of bank branches 
nationwide grew from 64,900 in 2000 to over 83,000 by the end of 
the decade.147 Local banks have opened branches inside 
supermarkets and other retailers thereby expanding the number of 
branches and the hours during which a teller is available to assist 
with banking services.148 Rarely are consumers charged on a 
piecemeal basis for this increased choice and customer service, but 
rather, all of these efforts are funded out of a handful of revenue 
streams. 
Once the trade-off between free checking and overdraft 
protection is recognized, however, the concern about whether the 
current allocation of banking fees is consistent with some arbitrary 
                                                                                                     
 146. The number of branches of commercial banks rose 39% between 1988 
and 2006. See Timothy H. Hannan & Gerald A. Nanweck, Recent Trends in the 
Number and Size of Bank Branches: An Examination of Likely Determinants 23 
J. OF FIN. TRANSFORMATION 155, 156 ( 2008). 
 147. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Table CB01: Number of Institutions, Branches, 
and Total Offices, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSO BRpt.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. Between 2003 and 2008 the number of retail-based bank branches 
increased from 5,581 to 6,162. Kevin Dobbs, In-Store Branches Could Boost 
Growth For Some Banks in the West, K.H. THOMAS ASSOCIATES, LLC (Sept. 1, 
2009), http://branchlocation.com/showArticle.php?id=68 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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definition of “fairness” is overwhelmed by a more significant point: 
the development of the current pricing model has promoted 
competition, innovation, and expanded access to the mainstream 
banking system to many consumers who traditionally were 
excluded.149 Replacing the outcomes of market competition and 
consumer free choice with those preferred by a bureaucratic design 
of prices and products will reverse all of these beneficial trends. 
Regulatory policies that result in the elimination of free checking 
and the imposition of higher fees will drive many consumers out of 
mainstream financial services and force them to rely on alternative 
financial products, such as check-cashers, prepaid card-issuers, and 
rent-to-own companies.150 While those credit-providers play a 
crucial and valuable role in serving certain members of the 
economy, especially unbanked consumers, it is difficult to conceive of 
a justification for government policies that promote reduced access 
to mainstream banks and greater reliance on those products. Yet 
this is the predictable unintended consequence of the cascade of 
government regulation since the financial crisis. In fact, as 
restrictions on overdraft fees and the Durbin Amendment’s price 
controls on debit card interchange fees have bitten deeper, these 
trends have been reversing. Fewer customers are now eligible for 
free checking, new fees have been imposed on existing services, 
quality and convenience have declined, and banks have begun 
closing branches. It is hard to see how these trends will benefit 
consumers. 
VI. Competition and Overdraft Protection 
If overdraft fees were simply a novel tool for banks to rip off 
consumers, then the growth of revenue from overdraft protection 
would be correlated with an increase in bank’s bottom-line 
profitability overall. Or, in economics jargon, the growth in 
interchange fee revenues would evidence “economic rents” or 
“economic profits” for those banks that have adopted overdraft 
protection. In fact, there is no evidence that risk-adjusted bank 
profitability has increased substantially during the period that 
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overdraft protection has spread and overdraft revenues have risen. 
Instead, profitability of depository institutions has remained 
relatively constant over time, even though overdraft revenues have 
risen substantially. Indeed, the crisis in bank solvency that began in 
2008 developed just as revenues from overdraft fees reached their 
peak. Nor is there any obvious difference in the overall profitability 
of those institutions that offer overdraft protection versus those that 
do not. This absence of any systematic evidence of major economic 
profits linked to the provision of overdraft protection suggests that 
the increased use of overdraft fees has been driven by the 
competitive need to meet growing consumer demand—not 
oppressive or unfair behavior by banks. 
The apparent absence of risk-adjusted economic profits can be 
explained by several different, overlapping explanations. First, 
although overdraft revenues have increased, bank risk and loss has 
increased as well by bringing into the banking system lower-income 
consumers with lower average balances, narrower profit margins for 
banks, and lower credit ratings.151 Moreover, as noted, the average 
loss on a non-paid overdraft loan is approximately $300, roughly ten 
times the amount of the standard overdraft fee ($30)152—suggesting 
that approximately ten or more successfully repaid overdraft loans 
are necessary to offset the losses from one defaulting overdraft 
customer. 
Further evidence that overdraft protection does not generate 
economic rents is the rapid spread of the product and general 
satisfaction with those who use overdraft protection regularly. The 
banking industry is highly competitive.153 This high degree of 
competition in the banking industry suggests that if any economic 
profits are earned from overdraft protection they are dissipated in 
the competitive process of extending banking services to more 
consumers or reducing other banking fees, such as monthly account 
maintenance fees. Banks offering overdraft protection also compete 
with non-bank products, such as payday lending, and evidence 
suggests that if the cost of overdraft protection became unduly high 
                                                                                                     
 151. See supra notes 63–79 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Evans, Litan, & Schmalensee, supra note 131, at 33 (finding that 
the retail banking industry is extremely competitive, even more competitive 
than the numbers suggest because technological advancements are allowing 
banks to more easily enter the market). 
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relative to those alternatives, then consumers could and would shift 
to those alternatives. Circumstantial evidence is provided by the 
absence of economic rents in the payday lending industry once risk 
and cost are considered154 and the beneficial effect of competition on 
payday loan prices.155  
Finally, the cost of retail banking has risen during the past 
decade as banks have increased the quality of bank services through 
innovation and expanded services, thereby competing away 
increased revenues from overdraft protection and debit card fees.156 
Of course, the opposite is true as well: if revenues from these are 
forcibly reduced, then banks will be forced to cut costs and services, 
which could include closing branches and charging for services that 
were formerly free. This economic reality is already appearing in the 
marketplace as regulations are causing many banks to abandon free 
checking and to adopt a la carte charges on products and services 
previously offered without charge.157 Rather than imposing new 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Paige Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, The Profitability of Payday 
Loans 2 (Dec. 10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/Vanderbilt%20Oxford%20profitability%20study%2012% 
2010%202007.pdf (finding that “payday lenders in a competitive market face 
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DETECTING PREDATORY LENDING 22 (Jan. 2007), available at 
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Phila., Working Paper No. 06-2, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
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predatory lending.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 156. Allen N. Berger, The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: 
Evidence from the Banking Industry, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 141, 168 
(2003). 
 157. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Attack of the New Bank Fees, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 4, 2012, at B8, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
10001424052970203436904577152580991517256.html?KEYWORDS=free+chec
king; Linda Stern, When Your Bank Doesn’t Want You, REUTERS ONLINE (Mar. 
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fees, other banks have chosen to trim costs by closing branches or 
otherwise reducing services.158 Again, there appears to be no 
coherent regulatory principle that would support the principle that 
the combination of lower revenues and a lower level of consumer 
services is preferable to the alternative from a safety and soundness 
perspective and thus should be encouraged by law. 
VII. Unintended Effects of Overdraft Protection Regulation 
Regulation of the terms of overdraft loans may also have 
negative unintended consequences. As noted, the Federal Reserve’s 
amendments to Regulation E, which adopted an opt-in regime for 
debit card overdraft protection, had the severe effect of reversing a 
decade-long increase in the percentage of free checking accounts at 
banks, and subsequent regulation has accelerated this trend.159 
Moreover, most of the regulations are patently absurd from a safety 
and soundness perspective: banking regulators have singled out for 
special concern the most profitable customers and terms of overdraft 
protection products without any empirical evidence or even 
plausible economic theory about how reducing revenues could 
improve safety and soundness.160 Moreover, overdraft programs 
have grown over the past decade, increasing their scope and volume, 
without any tangible evidence of heightened safety and soundness 
risk. In fact, most of these purported safety and soundness concerns 
are actually consumer protection concerns in disguise. An 
awareness of the incoherent nature of the safety and soundness 
concerns expressed by bank regulators may explain the tentative 
nature of many of these regulations. 
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 158. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Branch Closings Tilt Toward Poor Areas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at B1 (“The number of bank branches fell to 98,517 in 
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 159. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 160. Note the obvious point, which actually must be stated in this context: 
simply because a customer service or term is highly profitable (and thus 
beneficial from a safety and soundness perspective) does not mean that it is 
adverse to the interests of consumers. Profits in a free market economy 
generally are earned by providing a service that consumers desire and value. 
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Leaving aside these incongruities in safety and soundness 
issues, regulations could have unintended consequences for 
consumers and the banking system if interpreted in an unduly 
prescriptive manner. In addition, even if the FDIC’s approach is 
characterized by some degree of restraint, there remains a looming 
threat that the newly formed CFPB might seize the authority to 
regulate overdraft protection in a less measured and less informed 
manner, thereby potentially harming consumers and the economy. 
A. Regulating the Posting Order of Transactions 
The FDIC Guidance requires that banks not process 
transactions in a manner designed to maximize overdraft fees.161 As 
an example, the FDIC has suggested clearing items in the order 
received or by check number.162 Although the formal guidance does 
not speak further to the issue, the FDIC has stated that the practice 
of many banks of re-ordering transactions to clear payments from 
the largest- to smallest-value items is impermissible under the 
FDIC’s guidance because this will “tend to increase the number of 
overdraft fees.”163 The FDIC’s justification for the rule is the belief 
that it will improve consumer welfare by reducing the number of 
payments that bounce—by clearing multiple small payments first, 
the absolute number of payments that bounce will be reduced. The 
traditional convention of clearing larger payments first, by contrast, 
results in a more rapid depletion of funds, which leads to a larger 
number of smaller payments being rejected later thereby incurring 
a larger number of overdraft or bounced check fees. 
Although it is plausible that requiring smaller payments to be 
posted first will reduce the total amount of overdraft fees, the 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Overdraft Payment Program 
Supervisory Guidance Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www. 
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overdraft fees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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smaller obligations. Moebs Services, Consumer Overdraft Fees, supra note 21. 
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FDIC’s narrow focus on minimizing the total cost of overdraft 
protection ignores the potential benefit of overdraft protection to 
consumers. Requiring clearance from lowest to highest dollar value 
is contrary to the practice of many institutions which has been to 
clear larger items first—usually checks and ACH payments—under 
the assumption that larger items tend to be more important items 
such as payments for mortgage, rent, utilities, or other high-priority 
payments that consumers would want to be sure were paid. 
Although a requirement that smaller payments be cleared first 
would likely reduce the cost of overdraft fees, it ignores the fact that 
the benefit of paying larger items is usually greater because the 
consequences of dishonoring larger payments are more severe. 
Overdraft protection programs limit the amount of overdraft credit 
that can be extended, from $300 for low-balance free checking 
accounts up to $500 or $800 for more stable accounts.164 As a result, 
one large check added on top of several previously paid small debit 
card payments might exceed the available credit balance available 
for overdraft protection, leading large and more important 
payments to be rejected because honoring them would exceed the 
available credit line. 
In fact, a report by the Raddon Financial Group of one bank’s 
overdraft program found that 58% of its customers preferred that 
larger items be posted first, even though that might result in more 
overdraft charges in total.165 Among “elevated users” of overdraft 
protection the percentage that preferred larger items to be posted 
first rose to 60%.166 Thus, the FDIC guidance contradicts the 
expressed preferences of a majority of the bank’s customers, 
especially those who use overdraft protection most frequently, 
making consumers worse off. Put more mildly, government 
interference in contract terms typically is justified only if there is 
manifest evidence of a failure of market terms to reflect consumer 
preferences. The findings of the Raddon Report, while subject to 
qualification about its methodology, strongly suggests that more 
hard data is necessary before concluding that the contracted-for 
clearing order reflects a market failure rather than a term best left 
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to be established by competition and free choice, especially with 
respect to more frequent users. 
The problems that the FDIC’s guidance can cause in practice 
are illustrated by the experience of one bank after it changed its 
policy in October 2010 to comply with regulatory guidance to clear 
debit card payments before checks on the assumption that, in 
general, debit transactions are smaller in value than checks. As a 
result of its policy change, the bank has returned unpaid many more 
large payments than in the past. Comparing the two-month period 
before the rules went into effect with the two months following, the 
bank reports that the total number of checks and ACH items 
returned increased 4%, but the dollar value of the rejected payments 
returned increased 16%. Moreover, many of those returned 
payments were for important items like payments of mortgages, 
utilities, medical bills, student loans, rent, taxes, and even payday 
loans. Thus, while the rule might reduce the amount of overdraft 
fees paid, it comes at a heightened risk of rejecting larger, more 
important payments. It is far from obvious that this tradeoff 
improves consumer welfare. It is even less obvious that this is an 
appropriate issue to be resolved by a one-size-fits-all FDIC mandate 
that overrides consumer choice rather than by voluntary agreement 
between banks and their customers. 
B. Special Rules for “Excessive or Chronic” Overdraft Customers 
The FDIC guidance also requires banks to make special efforts 
to educate consumers who engage in “excessive or chronic use” of 
overdrafts, defined as making use of overdraft protection more than 
six times in a twelve month period.167 Defining “excessive or 
chronic” use as six instances in a twelve month period, of course, is 
entirely arbitrary. The rationale for this regulation appears to be 
that there is some number of overdraft transactions that regulators 
consider to be simply “too many” transactions and for which 
consumers would be better served by choosing some other means to 
meet those goals. The basis for this belief or this arbitrary number, 
however, is unclear. Indeed, actual consumer behavior and revealed 
consumer preferences suggest that the basis for this opinion is 
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paternalism by FDIC officials and is based on little or no 
investigation of the habits of those who use overdraft protection 
regularly. There is no reason to believe that the most regular users 
of overdraft protection are unaware of its cost or available 
alternatives. Therefore, it seems unlikely that these admonitions 
will cause many consumers to change their behavior. To be sure, 
some minority of bank customers may misuse overdraft protection 
and incur substantial fees. But if the events of recent years have 
taught anything, it is that virtually every type of consumer credit 
product can be misused or overused, including even traditional 
mortgages.  
As with virtually every other aspect of overdraft protection, this 
paternalistic regulation is least popular with the most frequent 
users of overdraft protection. According to the Raddon survey, 
although 89% of non-users of overdraft protection would want to be 
contacted after six overdrafts occur within a year, only 60% of 
elevated users would like to be contacted.168 Elevated users were 
also those most likely to opt-out of these notices if they could 
(33%).169 Thus, according to the survey, a majority of elevated users 
(those who are most likely to actually incur six overdrafts in a 
twelve month period) would want to be alerted when they reached 
six occurrences.170 On the other hand, providing such notice would 
incur some cost. Had the survey asked whether customers would be 
willing to pay in order to receive such notice (even a nominal fee 
such as processing and mailing costs), one suspects that the 
percentage of those who responded affirmatively would drop 
substantially, especially among elevated users. 
Moreover, very few customers are likely to be able to establish 
an alternative payment source for overdrafts. For example, in a 
filing with the FDIC on the proposed rules, one bank stated that of 
its 327,865 free checking accounts only 49,616—approximately 
15%—have savings accounts at the bank.171 Moreover, that figure 
includes all free checking customers: The number of customers with 
free checking who have a savings account and have used overdraft 
protection is probably even smaller in light of the fact that those 
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with sufficient funds to have a savings account are probably also 
less likely to overdraft.172 This small percentage of free checking 
customers with savings accounts is consistent with the findings of 
the Raddon survey, which found that only 13% of elevated users of 
overdraft would “transfer funds from another account” if overdraft 
protection was unavailable.173 The reason why repeat users of 
overdraft protection do not use linked savings accounts or other 
similar options is not because they do not realize that those options 
would be less expensive. They do so because those options simply 
are not available to frequent users, and to do without overdraft 
would force them to either do without the money (and suffer the 
resulting consequences) or use a payday lender.174 
The FDIC guidance also suggests that some customers may 
find it less expensive to open a bank line of credit.175 This is true but 
almost certainly irrelevant for most overdraft users because 
acquiring a discretionary line of credit requires a standard loan 
application and approval, which requires a credit score far in excess 
of that of most of the bank’s overdraft users. As noted, regular users 
of overdraft have low credit quality and limited credit alternatives. 
In addition, a line of credit typically requires a minimum line of 
credit of approximately $2,500, far exceeding the $300–$800 
available for overdraft protection. In fact, the spread of overdraft 
protection was hastened by the regulatory and economic difficulties 
of offering a line of credit to consumers.176 Few of those who use 
overdraft protection are likely to be approved for such a large line of 
credit. But if the bank were to offer a smaller line of credit, then the 
cost would rise substantially. In the end, therefore, the FDIC 
                                                                                                     
 172. According to the Raddon survey, almost half of elevated users of 
overdraft protection at one bank reported that they did not have sufficient funds 
to maintain a separate account from which overdrafts could be drawn. Raddon 
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 173. Id. 
 174. The findings on the reasons for using overdraft protection in light of 
available alternatives are consistent with the usage of other alternative credit 
products, such as payday lending. See generally Zywicki, supra note 80. 
 175. See FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 
1. 
 176. See Comment of International Bancshares Corp., supra note 37, at 4 
(“Recent regulatory changes affecting credit cards have resulted in a 
constriction of consumer credit which is exacerbated by the deepening trend of 
the credit card industry to cut credit lines.”). 
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guidance is almost completely irrelevant to the typical elevated user 
of overdraft protection, although the need to comply with the 
guidance will impose unnecessary administrative costs on banks 
and will have negative consequences for consumers. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Regulation by anecdote is always dangerous, and regulation of 
overdraft protection based on unrepresentative anecdote presents 
the risk of injuring consumers and the safety and soundness of the 
banking system. Safety and soundness regulators are targeting 
those borrowers who provide no safety and soundness risk (regular 
users who generate a net profit for banks). Moreover, it is these very 
same heavy users who report that they are the least likely to have 
easy, low-cost alternatives to overdraft protection and thus are the 
most likely to be diligent in maintaining their access to overdraft 
loans in good standing. Lacking any identifiable safety and 
soundness threat or identifiable market failure or evidence of 
consumer ignorance, regulation can be supported by only bald 
paternalism. As the lessons of history indicate, paternalistic 
regulation of consumer credit products tends to injure precisely 
those it is intended to help, by driving them to use less-preferred 
credit or reducing their access to credit generally, with all of the 
ancillary consequences. 
The Federal Reserve’s amendments to Regulation E 
implemented last year dealt a major blow to the availability and 
usefulness of overdraft protection for many consumers. The FDIC’s 
regulatory guidance threatens overdraft protection further. The 
OCC has raised concerns in its guidance as well. Undoubtedly, some 
consumers misuse overdraft protection. But as recent years have 
amply demonstrated, every type of consumer credit is potentially 
subject to misuse—even traditional mortgages. For millions of 
consumers, overdraft protection provides a short-term lifeline that 
enables them to avoid more expensive problems such as bounced 
checks, eviction, late fees on credit cards, or utility shutoffs. Lacking 
overdraft protection, many of these consumers could turn to less-
preferred alternatives such as payday lending. Regulators should be 
careful to ensure that in trying to prevent abuse or misuse of 
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overdraft protection, they do not go too far in the direction of making 
it too difficult to use or obtain. 
Regulators cannot wish away consumers’ need for credit. 
Eliminating access to overdraft protection will not eliminate the 
need that consumers have for it. History teaches the hard, but 
undeniable, lesson that well-intentioned paternalistic regulations 
that make it more difficult for consumers to obtain certain products 
cannot magically make them more financially responsible or make 
other less expensive products magically appear. Everyone makes 
errors when it comes to many things, including personal finances. 
Yet it remains the case that most of us most of the time know better 
than central planners what is right for ourselves and our families. 
Access to overdraft protection is no exception. According to the 
Raddon survey, 94% of one bank’s customers reported that use of 
overdraft protection should be their personal choice (including 92% 
of non-users and 96% of elevated users), and 89% reported their 
view that government should have no voice in how many overdrafts 
are allowed on your account.177  
Government intervention into a competitive market is typically 
justified only by demonstrable evidence of a market failure and 
confidence that interventions will ameliorate, not exacerbate, 
market failures. To date, such evidence is lacking for overdraft 
protection. All that regulation typically does is reduce access to one 
type of credit and thereby force consumers to make greater use of 
other, less-preferred products. Overdraft protection fills a unique 
need in the consumer credit marketplace. It provides convenient, 
flexible, lines of credit accessible twenty-four hours a day on 
demand, anywhere in the world, whether at an ATM, point-of-sale 
purchase, or in a  check transaction. If access to overdraft protection 
is taken away, where will consumers who count on it turn?  
Appendix A 
Form Overdraft Courtesy Customer Disclosure 
The Deposit Account Agreement controls the duties, obligations 
and rights of the Depositor, the Authorized Signatories and Bank 
with regard to your checking account. The Deposit Account 
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Agreement (and all amendments thereto) is incorporated herein for 
all purposes as if it were set forth verbatim, and its terms shall 
control any possible conflict, if any, between any provision of this 
Overdraft Courtesy Policy and the Deposit Account Agreement. This 
discretionary service is offered to our customers who are United 
States residents or Resident Aliens. 
Discretionary service. Bank is not obligated to pay any item 
presented for payment if your account does not contain sufficient 
available funds, and any discretionary courtesy payment (or other 
negotiation or processing) by Bank of any non-sufficient fund check 
or other item as identified below does not obligate Bank to pay any 
additional non-sufficient fund check or item or to provide prior 
notice of its decision to refuse to pay any additional non-sufficient 
fund check or item. Approval of payment of reasonable overdrafts by 
Bank on consumer accounts in good standing (as described below) is 
only a courtesy, and not a right or an obligation, is within Bank’s 
sole and absolute discretion, and can cease at any time without prior 
notice or reason or cause. 
“Good standing” requirement. Pursuant to Bank’s commitment 
to always “Do More, ” now and in the future, if your consumer 
account (primarily used for personal and household purposes) or 
your sole proprietor account has been opened for at least 30 days 
and is maintained in good standing, which includes at least: A) 
Making regular deposits consistent with your past practices; B) 
Depositing $300.00 or more in your account within each thirty (30) 
day period and bringing your account balance to a positive balance 
within every thirty-five (35) day period; C) You are not in default on 
any loan or other obligation to Bank; and D) You are not subject to 
any legal or administrative order or levy, Bank will consider, as a 
discretionary courtesy and not a right or obligation, approving your 
reasonable overdrafts.  
Limits. This courtesy will generally be limited to a maximum of 
(i) a $300.00 overdraft (negative) balance for “Free Checking 
Accounts,” (ii) a $500.00 overdraft (negative) balance for “Free 
Checking Accounts” that have been open and in good standing for at 
least one year, OR which have direct deposit, where there have been 
two or more direct deposits totaling at least $600.00 within the past 
sixty (60) day period, (iii) a $700.00 overdraft (negative) balance for 
“Free Checking Accounts” that have been open and in good standing 
for at least one year, AND which have direct deposit, where there 
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have been two or more direct deposits totaling at least $600.00 
within the past sixty (60) day period, (iv) a $500.00 overdraft 
(negative) balance for “Other Personal Checking Accounts/Free Biz 
Rite Accounts,” (v) a $700.00 overdraft (negative) balance for “Other 
Personal Checking Accounts/Free Biz Rite Accounts” that have been 
open and in good standing for at least one year, OR which have 
direct deposit, where there have been two or more direct deposits 
totaling at least $600.00 within the past sixty (60) day period, and 
(vi) a $900.00 overdraft (negative) balance for “Other Personal 
Checking Accounts/Free Biz Rite Accounts” that have been open and 
in good standing for at least one year, AND which have direct 
deposit, where there have been two or more direct deposits totaling 
at least $600.00 within the past sixty (60) day period. Customers are 
highly encouraged to balance their checkbook and use their 
overdraft courtesy in a responsible manner that avoids excessive 
fees. 
Covered Transactions. Overdraft Courtesy Program covers 
checks, in person withdrawals, ATM withdrawals, and electronic 
transactions. “Electronic transactions” includes automatic 
payments, online bill pay, and debit cards used at point of sale. 
Authorization and payment of overdrafts for ATM and everyday 
debit card transactions by Bank are subject to your “opt-in” decision 
to such coverage. 
Order of payment. It is the bank’s policy to clear items in the 
following order: (1) First any wire transfers from highest to lowest 
dollar amount; (2) items we have already paid out or committed to 
pay from lowest to highest dollar amount such as ATM withdrawals, 
teller cash withdrawals, transfers, and debit card or point of sale 
withdrawals; (3) checks and ACH withdrawals from highest to 
lowest dollar amount. Transactions may not be processed in the 
order in which they occur. The order in which transactions are 
processed can affect the total amount of overdraft/non-sufficient 
funds fees incurred. Bank reserves the right to clear in any order, as 
permitted by state law. 
One account per household. Generally, Bank will limit this 
discretionary courtesy to only one account per household. 
Repayment of overdrafts. The total of the courtesy overdraft 
(negative) balance, including any and all bank fees and charges, 
including all non-sufficient funds/overdraft fees and OD interest 
charges is due and payable upon demand, and Depositor and each 
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Authorized Signatory will continue to be liable, jointly and severally, 
for all such amounts, as described in the Deposit Account 
Agreement. 
Closing of account. If your account is not returned to a positive 
balance within forty-five days of the date it first become overdrawn, 
your account will be closed. 
Fees. The Bank will charge an overdraft fee of $29.00 for each 
item that is paid as an overdraft. Multiple overdraft fee charges up 
to six may be incurred on the same day. You will not be charged an 
overdraft fee if your ending account balance is overdrawn by $3.00 
or less. Fees are subject to change. You will receive advance notice of 
any fee increase in accordance with state and federal law. In 
addition, overdraft amounts will accrue an OD interest charge at 
the rate of 18% per annum. OD interest accrues from the date of the 
overdraft until the date of receipt by Bank of repayment of such 
overdraft. The amount of your overdraft courtesy will be reduced by 
the imposition of the fee(s). 
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